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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THIS YEAR THE courts have again been active in theaviation field, resulting in numerous significant deci-
sions. This article surveys those decisions, as well as other
aviation decisions addressing the following issues: juris-
diction, conflict of laws, governmental liability, air carrier
liability, products liability and negligence, insurance, and
damages.
I. JURISDICTION
A. Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The United States Supreme Court, in Verlinden v. Central
Bank of Nigeria,1 considered whether the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act, (the "Act") 2 in allowing a foreign
plaintiff to sue a foreign state in a United States District
Court on a non-federal cause of action, violates Article III
of the United States Constitution. The Court held that
Congress did not exceed the parameters of Article III by
granting federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over
certain civil actions by foreign plaintiffs against foreign
states where the rule of decision is governed by state law.
The Court stated that a suit against a foreign state under
the Act necessarily involves application of federal law,
and, therefore, "arises under" federal law within the
meaning of Article III. 4
The Court also affirmatively answered the question of
whether the Act embodies the "restrictive theory ' 5 of for-
eign sovereign immunity. Although the Act does not in-
clude specific statutory language incorporating the
"restrictive theory", the Court engrafted it onto the Act.6
Additionally, the Court held that the Act allows suits
, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611, 1330 (1982).
Verlinder, 461 U.S. at 492.
4 Id. at 497.
- The "restrictive theory" of foreign sovereign immunity confines immunity to
suits arising from a foreign sovereign's public acts and does not extend the for-
eign sovereign immunity to cases arising out of a foreign state's strictly commer-
cial acts. Id. at 487.
s Id. at 488.
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against foreign states to be brought either in federal or
state court.7
Although Verlinden involved letters of credit, it affects all
cases, including aviation cases, where jurisdictional issues
center on sovereign immunity. For example, following
Verlinden, the Ninth Circuit rendered an amended opinion
in Olsen v. Government of Mexico' to recognize the incorpo-
ration of the restrictive theory into the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. Olsen involved a wrongful death action
filed by the children of two Americans who were killed in
a California plane crash during an instrument approach to
Tijuana Airport. The two Americans, who had been in-
carcerated in Mexico, were being transferred to the
United States pursuant to the Prisoner Exchange Treaty
between the United States and Mexico. Although recog-
nizing the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immu-
nity, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found Mexico not
immune to subject matter jurisdiction. The court deter-
mined that Mexico's involvement in the crash did not in-
clude acts of a fundamentally governmental nature to
bring the foreign sovereign within the restrictive theory. 9
Mexico also contended that its conduct leading to the
crash was discretionary and, therefore, fell within the
"discretionary function exception" to the Act.' ° The
court, however, determined that the conduct of Mexico
which allegedly caused the crash, maintaining, directing
and piloting the aircraft, did not constitute policy deci-
sions but only acts taken to implement the broader plan to
exchange prisoners." Thus, the acts of Mexico which al-
legedly caused the crash occurred at the operational level
and did not fall within the discretionary function
7 Id. at 489. Section 1604 of 28 U.S.C. provides that the Act's standards control
in the "courts of the United States and of the States."
8 729 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1984).
9 Id. at 645.
- 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (1982). The court interpreted the exception by
referring to the Federal Tort Claims Act and its identical "discretionary function"
provision. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 646-47.
Olsen, 729 F.2d at 647.
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exception. 12
Subject matter jurisdiction was found under the "direct
effect" exception' 3 to sovereign immunity in Australian
Government Aircraft Factories and the Commonwealth of Australia
v. Lynne. 14 Lynne arose from the crash in Indonesia of an
airplane originally sold by an Australian company, Gov-
ernment Aircraft Factories (GAF), to Missionary Aviation
Fellowship (MAF), a California corporation. Survivors of
the American pilot killed in the crash filed a wrongful
death action in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California against GAF and the Com-
monwealth of Australia. MAFjoined in the suit to recover
for the loss of the aircraft. The defendants moved to dis-
miss the action under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act. 15 The district court overruled the motion and found
that subject matter jurisdiction existed under the "direct
effect" exception to the Act, which removes immunity in
cases based "upon an act outside of the territory of the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of
the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct ef-
fect to the United States." 16 The alleged direct effect was
the loss suffered by the survivors of the pilot and sus-
tained by MAF. t 7 The Ninth Circuit reversed, relying in
part on Berkovits v. Islamic Republic of Iran.t" The court of
appeals held that the injury to the pilot's family and the
losses sustained by MAF were indirect consequences of
the accident and could not support subject matter
12 Id.
13 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982).
,4 743 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1984).
is 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982).
16 Id. § 1605(a)(2) (1982).
17 Lynne, 743 F.2d at 674.
18 735 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1984). In Berkovitz, an action was brought against Iran
to recover damages for the wrongful death of an American citizen murdered in
Iran by an Iranian revolutionary group. In holding that Iran was protected by
sovereign immunity, the Ninth Circuit stated that the "injury to the victim's be-
reaved relatives living in the United States is not sufficiently 'direct' or 'substan-
tial' to support the assertion of Federal jurisdiction." Id. at 332 (quoting
Verlinden, B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1298 (S.D.N.Y.
1980)).
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jurisdiction. 19
The direct effect exception to immunity was also held to
be inapplicable in Close v. American Airlines, Inc. 20 where a
Connecticut resident filed suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Connecticut following an in-
jury sustained in Kingston, Jamaica. The injury occurred
during a layover on an American Airlines flight from
Montego Bay, Jamaica to New York when the plaintiff was
struck by the jet wash of a British West Indian Airways,
Ltd. (BWIA) aircraft. BWIA moved to dismiss the action
alleging, that it was not subject to the court's jurisdiction.
In response, the plaintiff raised the "direct effect" excep-
tion. The district court rejected the plaintiff's argument
that the consequent economic losses she suffered in the
United States as a result of her injury constituted a "direct
effect". 2' The court did leave open the question of
whether corporations injured in their "American pocket-
books by commercial activities" outside the United States
would be entitled to invoke the "direct effect" excep-
tion.22 This question appears, however, to have been an-
swered in the negative by Lynne.23
The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Illinois refused to dismiss on grounds of sovereign im-
munity a suit brought by a Canadian citizen against a for-
eign carrier for injuries sustained on a flight originating in
Seattle, Washington and terminating in Bangkok, Thai-
land. The court held, in Bryne v. Thai Airways International
Ltd. ,24 that jurisdiction was proper under the "commercial
activity" exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act 25 since the carrier engaged in commercial activity in
19 Lynne, 743 F.2d at 675.
20 587 F.Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
2 Id. at 1064.
22 Id. at 1065.
2 Lynne, 743 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1984).
24 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,363 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
25 Section 1605(a)(2) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the states in any case
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the United States by maintaining offices and by originat-
ing flights in this country.26 Because the plaintiff's flight
originated in the United States, the cause of action was
necessarily connected with that commercial activity.27
A motion to dismiss on grounds of immunity was de-
nied on the grounds of untimeliness in Aboujdid v. Singa-
pore Airlines, Ltd.28, a case arising out of the well-known
Entebbe hijacking incident. The plaintiffs, who were pas-
sengers on the hijacked aircraft, filed suit in 1978 alleging
that the defendants, both instrumentalities of foreign gov-
ernments, had failed to use proper security measures.
The court, noting the tortured procedural history of the
suit and the late date at which the defendant had moved
for dismissal under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, denied the motion as being unreasonable since it was
filed several years after suit was initiated.29 The court
read Verlinden as requiring the immunity issue to be re-
solved as a threshold inquiry30 and observed that "we are
hardly 'at the threshold' of these suits. ' ' 3 I Further, the
court held that the defendants had waived any claim of
immunity by litigating the case since 1978.32
A claim of sovereign immunity resulted in the dismissal
of a suit filed by ten European air carriers against the
United States and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) in Balair, Ltd. v. United States.33 The airlines had
claimed damages as a result of the FAA's prohibition of
DC-10 operations in the United States in the wake of the
American Airlines' DC-10 crash in Chicago. 4 The United
(b) in which the action is based upon an activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; ....
26 Byrne, 18 Av. Cas. at (CCH) 18,363.
27 Id.
28 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,059 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
9 The suits had been filed in 1978 and 1979. The carriers apparently moved to
dismiss in 1983. Id.
so Id. at 18,061.
31 Id.
s2 Id.
-s 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,692 (D.D.C. 1984).
-4 The FAA, after the crash, issued Special Federal Aviation Regulation 40,
19851
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States moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds of sover-
eign immunity. The court determined that jurisdiction
over the United States exists only where Congress has
consented to a cause of action against the United States or
where there is an explicit consent or waiver of immunity. 5
Since the jurisdictional statutes asserted by plaintiffs 36
did not contain an express waiver of sovereign immunity
to a suit for damages, the court held that it did not have
jurisdiction to hear the airlines' suit.3 7
In City of Alexandria v. Helms,38 the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals dismissed, on jurisdictional grounds, the issu-
ance of a preliminary injunction against the FAA by a
lower court. In August, 1983, an FAA administrator is-
sued an order to begin conducting flight pattern tests at
Washington's National Airport. A month later, a district
court temporarily enjoined the FAA from conducting the
tests. The FAA moved to dismiss the injunction on the
ground that the district court did not have jurisdiction to
issue a preliminary injunction pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
§ 1486(a), which vests review of FAA orders exclusively
with courts of appeals. Since the plan to begin con-
ducting flight pattern tests was a final order, the court de-
termined that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue
such an injunction. 9
B. Personal Jurisdiction
The United States Supreme Court in Helicopteros Nacion-
ales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,40 held that a non-resident Co-
lombian corporation sued in a wrongful death action
which prohibited the operation of DC-10 aircraft in United States airspace. SFAR
40 was rescinded on July 13, 1979.
35 Balair, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,693.
36 The carriers based jurisdiction upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("treaty jurisdiction")
and 28 U.S.C. § 1350, which provides that the district courts have "original juris-
diction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Id.
,1 Balair, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,693.
s" 728 F.2d 643 (4th Cir. 1984).
sq Id. at 646.
40 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984).
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arising from a helicopter accident in Peru, which did not
arise from any contacts with Texas, did not have sufficient
contacts with the State of Texas to make it amenable to in
personam jurisdiction in Texas courts without violating the
requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 ' Texas had assumed jurisdiction over
Helicol, a Colombian helicopter operator, in a suit filed by
the survivors of four United States citizens killed in the
Peruvian crash, even though Helicol had never main-
tained a place of business, been licensed, solicited busi-
ness, signed a contract, based an employee or an agent in
Texas, sold a product that reached Texas or conducted
operations there.4 2 The factors which the Texas Supreme
Court found supportive of jurisdiction were that Helicol
had, in the past, purchased helicopters in Texas and had
also sent prospective pilots and maintenance personnel to
Texas for training and consultation.43
The Court noted, relying on Perkins v. Benguet Consoli-
dated Mining Co. ,44 that due process is not offended when
the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the
foreign corporation's contacts with the forum, so long as
there are sufficient contacts between the foreign corpora-
tion and the state.4 5 However, these contacts must be of a
continuous and systematic nature so as not to offend
traditional notions of due process.46 After reviewing
Helicol's contacts with Texas, the Court held that its con-
tacts were not of a continuous and systematic nature so as
to bring Helicol within the jurisdiction of the Texas
courts.47 The Court reiterated that "purchases and re-
lated trips, standing alone, are not a sufficient basis for a
41 Id. at 1873. The Texas long-arm statute had previously been held by the
Texas Supreme Court to reach as far as due process permits. Hall v. Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. ("Helicol"), 638 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. 1982).
42 Helicapteros Nacionales, 104 S. Ct. at 1873.
43 Id.
44 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
45 Helicopteros Nacionales, 104 S. Ct. at 1872.
46 Id. at 1873.
I7 d. at 1874.
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State's assertion of jurisdiction. 48
The Court's decision indicates the need for more strin-
gent prerequisites for the assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion over foreign defendants, where their activities in the
forum do not "give rise" or "relate to" the cause of ac-
tion. This approach is contrary to the predicted trend
which appeared to make less of a distinction between as-
serting general or specific jurisdiction. Furthermore, the
resurrection of the Rosenberg analysis raises doubt as to the
ease with which foreign corporations involved in commer-
cial transactions in the United States can be subject to the
jurisdiction of American courts.
Conversely, in Maunder v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada,
Ltd.49 the Illinois Supreme Court had no difficulty in
reaching its determination that a foreign corporation had
engaged in such a pattern of continuous and systematic
activity that due process would not be offended by the as-
sertion of in personam jurisdiction over the corporation.
Maunder arose out of the crash of a DeHavilland aircraft in
Zambia which killed one Indian citizen and injured a Brit-
ish citizen. The aircraft had been designed and manufac-
tured in Canada by DeHavilland, a Canadian corporation.
Plaintiffs filed suit in Illinois against both DeHavilland
and its wholly-owned subsidiary, DeHavilland of Canada,
Inc., a Maryland corporation which has its principal place
of business in Illinois. In subjecting the Canadian manu-
facturer to jurisdiction in Illinois, the court noted that the
manufacturer's Illinois subsidiary had been established
solely to facilitate the manufacturer's business in the
United States. The court also observed that all of the sub-
sidiary's stock was owned by the parent, that the subsidi-
ary's directors were paid by the parent, that the parent
guaranteed the subsidiary's lease in Illinois, and that the
subsidiary's only business was the sale of parts in the
48 Id. (citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923)).
49 102 I1. 2d 342, 466 N.E.2d 217, cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3403 (U.S. Novem-
ber 26, 1984)(No. 84-512).
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United States for its parent's aircraft.5 °
The contacts between a British company and the State
of Maryland were insufficient to confer jurisdiction in
Mathison v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp.5 This suit arose out
of the crash of a military aircraft in California in which the
plaintiff's decedent was killed. McDonnell-Douglas, a
Maryland corporation with its principal place of business
in Missouri, manufactured the airplane and installed an
allegedly defective ejection seat manufactured by Martin
Baker Aircraft Company, Ltd., (Martin Baker), a corpora-
tion organized and headquartered in Great Britain. Mar-
tin Baker moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. The court, in dismissing the action against
Martin Baker, found that the forum's only connection
with the lawsuit was that McDonnell-Douglas was incor-
porated in Maryland.5 2
The Fifth Circuit, in Growden v. Ed Bowling & Associates,
Inc. ,5 also dismissed for want of jurisdiction a wrongful
death action filed in Louisiana by the survivors of two
Louisiana residents killed in an airplane crash in Louisi-
ana. Ed Bowlin & Associates, Inc., one of the defendants,
was a Georgia corporation which sold to plaintiffs' dece-
dents the used aircraft involved in the crash. Although
decedent Growden had initially telephoned Bowlin from
Louisiana, all other aspects of the sale took place out of
the forum state. The fact that the sale was prompted by
an advertisement the decedent saw in a national journal
was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction, according to the
court.5" Additionally, delivery in Louisiana was not signif-
50 Maunder, 466 N.E.2d at 222.
51' 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,710 (D. Md. 1984).
52 Id. at 17,722. The court observed that Martin Baker had never been author-
ized, licensed or chartered to conduct business in Maryland. Further, it had never
maintained an office in Maryland for manufacturing, distributing or storing its
product, and it had never done any direct advertising or business soliciting in the
state. Id.
-' 733 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1984).
54 Id. at 1151-52. Although the United States Supreme Court declared, in
Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), that jurisdiction
may be founded upon advertising reasonably calculated to reach the forum state,
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icant because the cited delivery was for tax purposes only.
Actual delivery occurred in Georgia, with one of the dece-
dents flying the craft to Louisiana.55 The fact that Bowlin
knew the craft would be based in Louisiana was of no con-
sequence, as was the fact that the aircraft was purchased
with checks drawn from a Louisiana bank. 56
C. Forum Non Conveniens
In Irish National Insurance Co. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta,57 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a lower court's
forum non conveniens dismissal of a subrogation action.
The suit was brought in New York-to recover damages al-
legedly sustained when a package containing integrated
circuits flown by Aer Lingus from Shannon, Ireland, to
New York was delivered in a damaged condition. The
court held that a treaty between the United States and Ire-
land required the district court to apply the same forum
non conveniens standards to the foreign parties that it
would have applied to United States citizens. 58 In addi-
tion to this error of law, the district court also erred in
assuming that Shannon, rather than New York was the
primary location of evidence. To correct these errors of
law and of fact, reversal was required.5 9
A Delaware court, in Siemer v. Bahri Aviation, Inc. ,60 dis-
missed on grounds of forum non conveniens a wrongful
death action filed in Delaware by survivors of a Norwegian
citizen killed in a Greek air crash. Although the court in
its original opinion had refused to dismiss the action be-
cause there was no pending action in Greece, the court
determined, on rehearing, that the defendant's waiver of
the Fifth Circuit determined that more than that factor alone is required for as-
serting jurisdiction. Growden, 733 F.2d at 1151.
55 Id. at 1152.
56 Id.
57 739 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1984).
11 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1950, United
States - Ireland, art. VI(I)(C), 1 U.S.T. 785, 790-91, T.I.A.S. No. 2155 § 1 at 8.
59 Irish National Insurance, 739 F.2d at 92.
- 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,087 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984).
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limitations and voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
Greek courts were sufficient to now require dismissal. Ad-
ditionally, the court noted that the plaintiffs only connec-
tion with Delaware and, in fact, the United States, was its
incorporation in Delaware. On the other hand, the plain-
tiff's principal place of business and all of its records relat-
ing to the operation and maintenance of the aircraft were
readily available in Greece. In sum, the court held that
the plaintiff would not be overly burdened if required to
litigate in Greece, while the defendant faced a decided
disadvantage if the trial were held in Delaware.6'
A similar result was reached in Rubenstein v. Piper Aircraft
Corp,6 2 a wrongful death action filed by citizens of West
Germany in Florida against Piper, a Pennsylvania corpora-
tion, as a result of an air crash in West Germany. The
plane had been designed and manufactured in Florida by
Piper. The court held that an adequate remedy would be
afforded the plaintiff if the case were tried in West Ger-
many. The principal guidance for the court, in dismissing
the action, was the rule that foreign plaintiffs should not
be encouraged to initiate actions in forums other than in
their homeland merely to increase the chance of reward
or victory.63
Whether a wrongful death action filed in a Texas state
court pursuant to the Texas Wrongful Death Act 64 is sub-
ject to dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds re-
mains unsolved after the Texas Supreme Court's decision
in Couch v. Chevron International Oil Co. ,65 In Couch, a Jones
Act 66 suit was brought by Scottish survivors of a Scottish
seaman who died of injuries sustained while working on a
-1 Id. at 18,088.
62 587 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
- Id. at 462 (citing Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
- TEx REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4671-4678 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
- 672 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist]) writ refdn.r.e percuriam, 28
Tex. Sup. Ct.J. 181 (Dec. 19, 1984). Although the doctrine offorum non conveniens
is recognized in Texas, the Texas Supreme Court had previously reserved ruling
on whether the doctrine applies to wrongful death actions. Flaiz v. Moore, 359
S.W.2d 872 (Tex. 1962).
-" 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
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Scottish-owned diving support vessel in the North Sea.
The trial court dismissed the action on the grounds of fo-
rum non convemens.
On motion for new trials the plaintiffs asserted that in
addition to their Jones Act suit, they were also seeking re-
covery under article 4678 of the Texas Wrongful Death
Act to enforce their English causes of action.6 7 The trial
court denied the motion for new trial because the plain-
tiffs failed to amend their pleadings to include their article
4678 cause of action. The plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs'
failure to timely plead their article 4678 cause of action
foreclosed their right to recover under that statute. The
defendants further contended that even if plaintiffs had
properly raised article 4678 in their pleadings, the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens would still require dismis-
sal.68 In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals
chose not to base its decision on the plaintiffs' waiver of
their article 4678 cause of action. Instead, the court held
that even if plaintiffs' cause of action had been properly
pleaded, the dismissal for forum non conveniens was
correct.69
The Texas Supreme Court initially refused without
comment to review the appellate court's decision finding
no reversible error. However, in its per curiam opinion
rendered on motion for rehearing of the application for
writ of error, the Texas Supreme Court stated:
We refused this writ application, finding no reversible er-
ror, because we agreed that the plaintiffs waived their Arti-
cle 4678 cause of action. The Court of Appeals opinion,
67 The Texas Wrongful Death Act provides, in pertinent part:
Death in foreign state.
Whenever the death of a [foreign] citizen . . . has been . . . caused
by the wrongful act . . . of another in any foreign . . . country for
which a right to maintain an action and recover damages thereof is
given by. . . such foreign. . . country. . . such right of action may
be enforced in the courts of this State.
TEX REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
68 Couch, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct.J. 5 at 181.
69 Couch, 672 S.W.2d at 18.
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however, does not mention this waiver. Although the
Court of Appeals reached the correct decision, that part of
its opinion pertaining to Article 4678 and forum non con-
veniens is dicta. Thus, the applicability of forum non con-
veniens to an Article 4678 cause of action is an open
question. 70
D. Death on the High Seas Act and Suits in Admiralty Act
In Miller v. United States,7 1 the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals determined that the Suits in Admiralty Act 72 ap-
plies to airplane crashes in international waters caused by
land-based negligence. In Miller, plaintiff's decedent died
in the crash of an airplane in international waters while on
a flight from Freeport, Bahamas, to Palm Beach, Florida.
The accident occurred in May, 1976, and suit was filed in
1980 under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 73 The defend-
ants moved to dismiss the action, contending that admi-
ralty jurisdiction applied rather than jurisdiction under
the Federal Tort Claims Act. The plaintiff argued, how-
ever, that admiralty jurisdiction was not applicable since
the negligence causing the crash occurred on land and
that the acts bore no significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity.
In rejecting this argument, the court of appeals noted
that actions involving water vessels may be subject to the
locality test, 74 but that test alone is not dispositive of avia-
tion cases.75 Relying on Executive Jet Aviation v. City of
Cleveland,76 the court held that a wrongful death action
arising out of an airplane crash on the high seas, a marine
league or further from the shore of a state, may be
brought under the federal court's admiralty jurisdiction.7 7
70 Couch, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 5 at 181.
71 725 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 94 (1984).
72 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1982).
73 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982).
74 Miller, 725 F.2d at 1313.
75 Id.
7( 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
7 Miller, 725 F.2d at 1315.
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In accordance with decisions from the Fifth 78 and Ninth
Circuits,79 the Eleventh Circuit determined that admiralty
jurisdiction existed since the crash occurred more than
one marine league from the shores of the continental
United States. 80 The court also found that a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity existed since a
ship was the traditional mode of transportation between
the Bahamas and the United States before the develop-
ment of air travel. The court subsequently dismissed the
actions because plaintiffs failed to bring suit within the
two year limitations period provided by the Suits on Ad-
miralty Act."'
E. Federal Removal
In Elbaz v. The Port Authority of New York, 82 the plaintiff
moved to remand an action removed by an air carrier four
years after suit was filed and just prior to commencement
of trial. The carrier argued that the Verlinden decision had
changed the law, establishing that aliens may sue foreign
states in federal courts under the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munitites Act. The court rejected this argument on the
grounds that there had been no controlling authority
prohibiting removal since the inception of the suit. Of
further significance was the fact that no claim of sovereign
immunity was involved in the suit nor were there issues on
America's foreign relations. To avoid further delay, the
court granted the motion to remand.8 3
78 Ledoux v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 609 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1980); Hig-
genbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973), aff'd in part,
545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
79 Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070
(1974); T.J. Falgout Boats, Inc. v. United States, 508 F.2d 855 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975).
8o 725 F.2d at 1314-15.
a I/d.
812 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,462 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
83 Id. at 17,463.
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II. CONFLICT OF LAWS
The "most significant relationship test" embodied in
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and the "govern-
mental interest" analysis continue to be the favored meth-
odologies employed by the courts in resolving choice of
law issues in air crash litigation. For example, in Saloomey
v. Jeppesen & Co. ,84 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to apply the Connecticut lex loci delicti rule, opting
instead to employ the "most significant relationship" test
to a wrongful death action arising from the crash of a
small airplane during an instrument approach to a West
Virginia airport. 5 Suit was filed in Connecticut by a Con-
necticut resident alleging that Jeppesen, a Colorado com-
pany, either negligently or defectively designed the
approach plate used by the pilot during the approach.
Following the Restatement analysis, the Second Circuit de-
termined that Colorado law, rather than the law of West
Virginia or Connecticut, should apply to both the liability
and damages issues because most of the significant con-
tacts were centered in Colorado. Given the strong impact
of the Colorado contacts, the court found that Connecti-
cut law did not apply even though both decedents were
domiciled in Connecticut. West Virginia law was also
deemed inapplicable since the only significant contact
with the parties and issues was the fortuitous circum-
stance of the crash occurring there. 6
Also, the Supreme Court of Texas, which had previ-
ously adopted the Restatement approach in tort cases, held,
in Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. ,87 that "in all choice of law
cases, except those contract cases in which the parties
have agreed to a valid choice of law clause, the law of the
- 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 674. Although the Connecticut Supreme Court had endorsed the use
of lex loci delicti, the Second Circuit noted that the endorsement was made in "mo-
tor vehicle cases," and that the Connecticut courts had never had occasion to ap-
ply ex loci delicti to an aviation accident. Id.
- Id. at 676.
S7 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984). For a further discussion of Duncan, see infra
notes 293-298 and accompanying text.
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state with the most significant relationship to the particu-
lar substantive issue will be applied to resolve that is-
sue." 88 In Duncan, the court considered whether a liability
release executed by a Texas resident in Texas discharged
Cessna, a Kansas corporation, from liability to the plain-
tiffs stemming from a New Mexico plane crash even
though it was not specifically named in the release.
Cessna sought to have New Mexico law, which discharges
any tortfeasor who is named or who comes within the gen-
eral class of persons named in the release, applied to the
release. Plaintiffs, however, contended that Texas law,
which discharges only those tortfeasors specifically identi-
fied in the release, should have applied. The court found
no legitimate reason for New Mexico to be concerned
with the application of its statute to a Texas settlement to
cut off a Texas resident's claim against a Kansas corpora-
tion and elected to apply Texas law to determine the ef-
fect of the release.89
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in O'Rourke v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,90 refused to "wade into New York's
choice of law quagmire," 9 ' and approved the lower
court's use of the lex loci delicti rule in applying New York
law rather than Greek law to determine what damages
were recoverable by the estate of a Greek seaman who
died in the June, 1975, crash of Eastern Air Lines Flight
66 near John F. Kennedy Airport.92 The court noted that
although New York was one of the first states to reject the
lex loci approach in favor of a more flexible methodology,
recent state court decisions had signaled a return to lex
loci. 93 Rather than add to the confusion, the court de-
ferred to the district judge's interpretation of the New
York choice of law rule.94
88 Duncan, 665 S.W. 2d at 421.
- Id. at 421-22.
- 730 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1984).
m Id. at 847.
1 Id. at 849.
' Id. at 847-48.
114 Id. at 849.
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The United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, also interpreting New York's choice of
law rules, applied the governmental interest approach in
Gregory v. Garret Corp.95 Although the court recognized
that lex loci delicti remains the general rule in tort cases
pending in New York and is to be displaced only in "ex-
traordinary circumstances," the court determined that ex-
traordinary circumstances existed inasmuch as the site of
the airplane crash was "to some extent fortuitous. ' 96 The
court held that New York law, rather than the law of Con-
necticut or North Carolina, should apply to allow third-
party contribution claims against the employer of employ-
ees killed in the crash of a jet aircraft at Westchester
County Airport, New York. The court observed that most
of the contacts concerning the parties and their relation-
ships were centered in New York and New York had
stronger interests than Connecticut or North Carolina in
advancing its policies of holding a co-tortfeasor responsi-
ble for its share of a claimant's injury and in deterring tor-
tious conduct. 7
In Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. ,98
the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia, applying the governmental interest methodology, de-
termined that foreign jurisdictions have no interest in
applying their law to issues regarding damages if it would
result in less protection to their nationals in a suit against
a United States corporation.99 The case arose out of the
crash of a Lockheed C-5A military transport near Saigon,
Vietnam, in which a number of foreign infants were in-
jured. The court excluded from the jury's consideration
collateral sources of payments to the foreign infants for
medical services. 1 00
The United States District Court for the District of Co-
578 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Id. at 880.
97 Id. at 881.
98 487 F. Supp. 180 (D.D.C. 1984).
, Id. at 191.
1o Id.
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lumbia, in Felch v. Air Florida Inc. ,1o applied the most sig-
nificant relationship test under the District of Columbia's
choice of law rules to determine whether the law of the
District of Columbia or Virginia should apply to a claim
for loss of consortium by a Virginia resident for injuries to
a spouse suffered before the marriage. 10 2 The court, in
holding that Virginia law should apply, determined that
Virginia's interest in the welfare of its residents was more
relevant to a loss of consortium claim than the District of
Columbia's interest in punishing and deterring wrongful
conduct. 10 3
The remaining cases illustrate the flexibility of modern
approaches to choice of law determinations. Kiehn v.
Elkem-Spigerverket A/S Kemi-Metal'04 involved the crash of a
small airplane in Norway which killed the plaintiff's dece-
dent, a Pennsylvania resident. The airplane was rented in
Norway by a Norwegian pilot, who was also an employee
of the defendant Norwegian corporation, for a trip solely
within Norwegian airspace. The court determined that
under Pennsylvania's "hybrid" choice of law rule, which
combines the approaches of the Restatement and "interest
analysis", Norwegian law should apply to the liability is-
sues and the law of Pennsylvania should apply to the issue
of damages. 0 5 Norway was found to have a significant
governmental interest in regulating air traffic within its
borders and in deterring similar accidents. The court
noted that these interests would be served by applying
Norwegian law to liability issues. 10 6 In applying Penn-
sylvania law to the issue of damages, the court found that
Pennsylvania's interest in compensating the heirs of Penn-
sylvania decedents and dependents was significantly
greater than Norway's interest in shielding its resident
to] 562 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1983).
102 Id. at 385. This litigation arose out of the Air Florida disaster which oc-
curred in Washington, D.C., on January 13, 1982.Id.
to Id. at 386.
104 585 F. Supp. 413 (M.D. Pa. 1984).
,05 Id. at 416.
to,! Id.
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business from an excessive verdict.10 7
Finally, in Aircrash Disaster at Mannhein, Germany on Sep-
tember 11, 1982, l08 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania used Pennsylvania's hy-
brid approach to apply Pennsylvania law to the liability is-
sues in suits arising out of the crash in West Germany of a
United States Army "Chinook" helicopter manufactured
by a Pennsylvania corporation. The court stated that the
interest of Pennsylvania in seeking to hold its manufactur-
ers as guarantors of the safety of their product would be
furthered by the application of Pennsylvania law. The
court also determined that the Pennsylvania principles of
placing the risk of loss on its manufacturers and of full
compensation would be furthered by applying Penn-
sylvania damage law to the claims filed by European citi-
zens. 109 Finally, the court stated that it was not unfair to
hold a defendant manufacturer to the damage laws of its
own state, when acting in its own state, where that law
provides greater protection to the plaintiff. 10
III. GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY
A; Exceptions
In one of the most important cases decided during the
period of this survey, the United States Supreme Court
held, in United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense, "I that an action against the United States for
the alleged negligence of the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration ("FAA") in the certification of aircraft for use in
commercial aviation was barred by the "discretionary
,07 Id. at 416-17.
-8 575 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
-, Id. at 526.
110 Id.
... 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Varig Airlines]. United States v.
United Scottish Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982), was consolidated for deci-
sion with Varig Airlines, 461 U.S. 925 (1983). For a comprehensive discussion of
Varig Airlines and United Scottish prior to the Court's decision, see generally Krause
and Cook, The Liability of the United States for Negligent Inspection - 1983, 48J. AIR L.
& CoM. 725 (1983).
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function exception" of the Federal Tort Claims Act.'" 2
The Court, in reaching its decision, isolated several fac-
tors which it considered helpful in determining when a
government employee's acts are shielded from liability by
Section 2680(a)." 3 First, the Court emphasized that the
nature of the conduct, not the status of the actor, governs
whether the exception applies." 4 The "basic" inquiry, ac-
cording to the Court, is whether the acts challenged are of
the "nature and quality" meant to be shielded by Con-
gress." 5 Second, the Court found that the exception was
plainly intended to include the discretionary acts of the
government in its role as a regulator of private conduct
since "Congress wished to prevent judicial 'second guess-
ing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded
in social, economic, and political policy through the me-
dium of an action in tort."'" 6
In light of these factors, the Court scrutinized the statu-
tory and regulatory authority creating the means by which
the FAA certifies aircraft and found that the "FAA's im-
plementation of a mechanism for compliance review is
plainly discretionary activity of the nature and quality pro-
tected by Section 2680(a)."' 7 The Court determined that
judicial intervention in the FAA's compliance review pro-
gram, which is composed of a spot-check system, would
not only affect the feasibility and practicality of the regula-
tory program, but could also usurp the FAA's ability to
112 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680(a) (1982). The Federal Tort Claims Act autho-
rizes suits against the government for damages caused by the negligence of a gov-
ernment employee while acting within the scope of his employment. Congress,
however, excepted from the Act's waiver of sovereign immunity several classes of
tort claims. The discretionary function exception provides that the Federal Tort
Claims Act shall not apply to "[any claim ...based upon the exercise or per-
formance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on
the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not
the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
1 Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct. at 2765.
1" Id. According to the Court, the exception covers all government employees
exercising discretion. Id.
116 Id.
,,7 Id. at 2768.
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establish priorities for the accomplishment of its safety
objectives. The Court found that such intervention would
necessarily involve the judicial second-guessing which the
discretionary function exception was designed to
prevent." 18
In addition, the Court held that FAA employees, acting
in accordance with FAA directives, were also protected by
the discretionary function exception in electing not to in-
spect certain items during the course of certificating a par-
ticular aircraft. 119 However, one issue which arguably
remains after Varig Airlines is whether the government,
once it makes a decision to inspect certain items during
the certification of an aircraft, is responsible if it negli-
gently conducts the inspection. Two decisions rendered
after Varig Airlines have refused to hold the United States
liable.
In Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. United States, 120
the Ninth Circuit considered the argument that the FAA
failed to properly inspect a modification developed for the
Sabreliner aircraft resulting in a delay in discovering the
existence of defects in the modification. Finding Varig Air-
lines controlling, the court held that the FAA's failure to
discover the defects in the Sabreliner modification sooner
was activity protected by the discretionary function
exception. 121
In Proctor v. United States, 1 22 a subrogation suit against
the United States for the hull loss of a Lockheed L-10 11
'is Id. The government also argued for reversal on the ground that the conduct
of the FAA in certificating aircraft is a core governmental activity that is not ac-
tionable under the Act because no private individual engages in analogous activ-
ity, and on the ground that the claims against the government were based upon
misrepresentations contained in the certificates and, therefore, were barred by the
misrepresentation exception to the Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982). The Court
found it unnecessary to address these issues since it reversed the Ninth Circuit on
the discretionary function exception. Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct. at 2766 n. 12. The
Court also declined to examine whether the Ninth Circuit erred in applying Cali-
fornia's "Good Samaritan" doctrine to the FAA certification process. Id. at 2766.
"1 Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct. at 2769.
,2 0 742 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1984).
'21 Id. at 504-05.
12 No. CV 83 3415 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 1984).
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aircraft and for indemnification arising out of the August
19, 1980, Saudia Arabian Airlines accident in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia, it was argued that the FAA negligently per-
formed the certification inspection of the L-10 11 rather
than electing not to inspect as in Varig Airlines.12 The
court dismissed the case holding that the Supreme Court
had, in Vang Airlines, insulated from tort liability the entire
FAA certification process. 124 The court noted that a con-
trary result would lead to the situation where the FAA
would be immune from liability under Vang Airlines if it
certified an aircraft without inspection, but would be sub-
ject to liability for any certificated aircraft it did inspect.1 2 1
In Colorado Flying Academy v. United States, 126 a case de-
cided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals before the
Supreme Court's decision in Vang Airlines, it was found
that the discretionary function exception insulated the
government from liability based on the FAA's alleged
negligence in not designing the Denver terminal control
area ("TCA") to fully contain within its confines an instru-
ment approach. The court agreed with plaintiffs' conten-
tion that if the FAA's directives concerning TCA airspace
design created a mandatory duty to contain the instru-
ment approach within the TCA, then the FAA's negligent
failure to carry out that duty would not fall within the ex-
ception.127 After carefully reviewing the various FAA reg-
ulations and directives, the court found no substantial
evidence to demonstrate that such mandatory duty ex-
isted. Thus, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's
finding that the claim of government negligence in de-
signing the Denver TCA was barred by the discretionary
function exception. 28
In a second case decided before the Court's decision in




12(i 724 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1984).
" 2 Id. at 875.
128 Id. at 876.
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Western District of Pennsylvania held, in Rulli v. United
States, 1 29 that claims involving communication deficiencies
in navigational aids and the FAA's failure to increase com-
munication efficiency leading to the crash of an airplane
while on an instrument approach fall squarely within the
discretionary function exception.3 0 However, the FAA's
failure to inspect or commission navigational aids at the
operational level consistent with federal regulations is not
conduct insulated by the exception.13 '
The United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia was presented with a unique issue in Beattie v.
United States,' 32 a suit arising from the crash of an Air New
Zealand DC-10 in Antarctica on November 28, 1979. The
claimants brought the action under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, claiming negligence by United States Navy air
traffic controllers based at McMurdo Naval Station in fail-
ing to advise the DC-10 crew of hazardous meteorological
conditions along the aircraft's route. The United States
moved to dismiss, asserting that by virtue of Section
2680(k), "any claim arising in a foreign country" is ex-
empt from the coverage of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The question before the court was whether Antarctica is a
"foreign country" within the meaning of the statute. The
district court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that
"although the issue is not free from doubt," the foreign
country exemption of the Federal Tort Claims Act does
not bar the claimant's action. 33 In reaching its determi-
nation that Antarctica is not a "foreign country", the
court relied principally on the construction of other fed-
eral statutes which expressly or impliedly exclude Antarc-
tica from the "foreign country" category and on the fact
that the United States government is significantly involved
in Antarctic activities, including the control of all air
1' 581 F. Supp. 1502 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
-0 Id. at 1508.
, , Id. at 1512.
132 592 F. Supp. 780 (D.D.C. 1984).
'- Id. at 784.
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transportation and search and rescue operations in Ant-
arctica. The court also noted that no one would be held
liable for the alleged negligence of the United States if the
government's motion to dismiss were granted.13 4
B. General Cases
In Nex v. United States,'3 5 a wrongful death action
brought against the FAA arising out of the crash of an air-
plane during an instrument landing approach in instru-
ment meteorological conditions ("IMC"), the court held
that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the instrument land-
ing system ("ILS") malfunctioned or in any manner
guided the aircraft off the correct approach course.1 36
The court further held that the air traffic controller prop-
erly monitored the airplane's progress in radar and that
the controller's failure to use a written checklist in accom-
plishing a controller change in the airport tower, though
against FAA procedures, was not a proximate cause of the
crash. The controller's failure to give runway visibility
value to the pilot was also found not to be a proximate
cause of the crash since the runway visibility value was
favorable and would have likely encouraged the pilot to
have continued the approach. 3 7
In Stewart v. United States, 138 the United States District
Court for the District of Idaho assessed a government air
traffic controller with negligence in causing the mid-air
collision of two aircraft operating in visual flight rules
("VFR") conditions near Mountain Home Air Force Base,
Idaho, on the evening of June 21, 1981. The court found
that the controller gave an erroneous radar traffic advi-
sory to the pilot who had elected to use the VFR radar
advisory service offered by Mountain Home Air Force
Base. 39 Although the court assessed each of the aircraft's
,34 Id. at 783-84.
'- 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,982 (S.D. Iowa 1984).
,36 id. at 17,984.
137 Id. at 17,986-87.
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,047 (D. Idaho 1984).
'9 Id. at 18,048.
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pilots with twenty percent negligence for their failure to
see and avoid the other aircraft, the controller was as-
sessed with the remaining sixty percent negligence be-
cause his "incorrect advisories so diverted the Piper
aircraft pilot's attention to the extent that he lost the op-
portunity to have seen and avoided the Cessna air-
craft." 140 The court also found that the pilot being given
the advisories had a "high probability to see and avoid the
other aircraft"' 4 1 due to existing light conditions and
flight path had it not been for the erroneous advisories. 142
In Barber v. United States,'14 a case twice appealed to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and remanded, the United
States District Court for the District of Oregon held the
FAA sixty percent negligent for instructing an instrument
rated pilot to use a non-directional radio beacon ("NDB")
in his ILS approach to an airport without notifying him
that two pilots had earlier reported that the beacon was
not operating properly, the last report being only twenty-
seven minutes before the pilot was cleared for the ap-
proach. 14 4 The court further found the FAA negligent in
failing to remove the NDB from service after receiving nu-
merous complaints in the month before the crash con-
cerning the beacon's reliability. 45 The pilot was held to
be forty percent negligent for deviating from his clearance
and attempting a non-precision approach without re-
questing an amended clearance from the controller or de-
claring an emergency. 4 6
In Air Service, Inc. v. United States, 147 it was held, in an
action arising out of a mid-air collision between an aircraft
departing the Greenville, Mississippi airport and an air-
plane entering the airport traffic area unannounced, that
140 Id. at 18,049.
,4, Id. at 18,050.
142 Id.
14 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,053 (D. Or. 1984).
144 Id. at 18,057.
145 Id.
14 Id. at 18,058.
147 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,556 (N.D. Miss. 1983).
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the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving that the
controller was negligent in failing to see the arriving air-
plane and in failing to tell the pilot of the departing air-
craft of the conflicting traffic.148 The court found that the
proximate causes of the crash were the failure of the pilots
to "see and avoid" each other in VFR conditions, the fail-
ure of the arriving pilot to inform the tower of his pres-
ence in the traffic pattern and of his intentions, and the
failure of the departing aircraft to avoid the landing traffic
pattern. 149
The United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Oklahoma, in Kanner v. Ross School of Aviation,
Inc.,150 held that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden
of proving that the air traffic controller was negligent in
causing the collision between two student pilots in an air-
port traffic pattern shortly after the controller made sev-
eral repetitions of an instruction in rapid succession to
one of the student pilots without the inclusion of the air-
plane's call sign. 15 Since the call sign was included in the
first of the series of rapid transmissions, the court found
that the controller had given a continuous transmission
which did not violate the air traffic control manual and
that the transmission was an adequate response to an
emergency situation.15 2
In an action to recover damage to a corporate jet on
takeoff after its engines ingested sea gulls, the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut, in In-
surance Co. of North America v. City of New Haven,15 3 held that
air traffic controllers at the Tweed-New Haven Airport
were not negligent in failing to advise the crew of the air-
craft that sea gulls were on or near the runway on the
morning of the accident. 54 The court found that air traf-
148 Id. at 17,567.
149 Id. at 17,568.
150 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,934 (N.D. Okla. 1984).
15, Id. at 17,938.
1,52 Id.
15. 574 F. Supp. 373 (D. Conn. 1983).
154 Id. at 380.
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fic controllers have a duty to warn the crew of an airplane
of dangers apparent to the controllers, but the evidence
presented showed that the controller on duty neither saw
nor was informed that sea gulls were in the vicinity of the
runway prior to the takeoff. The court further found that
the cause of the accident was the co-pilot's failure to re-
port his sighting of the sea gulls to the pilot.
55
Finally, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, in In re Air Crash Disaster at Metropoli-
tan Airport, Detroit, Michigan on January 19, 1979, 156 reaf-
firmed the premise that, under VFR conditions, the
primary responsibility for safe operation of an airplane
rests with the pilot, regardless of traffic clearance. 57 The
court refused to find the air traffic controller's alleged
negligence in not maintaining adequate separation be-
tween a departing aircraft and a landing Learjet to be a
proximate cause of the crash because the controller was
not required to anticipate or foresee the negligent act of
the Learjet pilot in decreasing his speed to the point of
stalling the aircraft in an effort to maintain adequate sepa-
ration.1 58 The court also held that the judge, not the jury,
must determine the liability of the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, even in situations where the
United States has settled with the original plaintiff and it
then brings an action against its co-defendants for contri-
bution and indemnity for the purpose of allocating fault
among the litigants. 59
IV. AIR CARRIER LIABILITY
A. Warsaw Convention: Jurisdiction
Several courts addressed the issue of subject matter ju-
risdiction of the Warsaw Convention' 60 (the "Conven-
155 Id.
1-- 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,915 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
157 Id. at 17,920.
1 .58 Id.
I's ld. at 17,918.
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
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tion") during the past year. In Camacho v. Aerovias
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.,161 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed an
action against a foreign carrier on the grounds of subject
matter jurisdiction because the court where the action was
filed was not located in one of the places specified in Arti-
cle 28 of the Convention for bringing suit. 162 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
in In re Air Crash Disaster at Malaga, Spain, on September 13,
1982,163 also dismissed an action against a foreign carrier
on the grounds that the court lacked subject matter juris-
diction under Article 28.164 The court determined that
the passenger's "ultimate destination"1 65 was Spain, since
the passenger had simultaneously purchased two one-way
tickets for a round-trip between Spain and the United
States, and the crash occurred while he was traveling from
Spain to the United States. 166 The court, however, re-
fused to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction an
action of another passenger where she proved that her
"ultimate destination" was, in fact, the United States even
though a round-trip ticket had been issued for a destina-
Transportation by Air, opened for signature, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.I.A.S.
No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 reprinted in, 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976) [hereinafter cited
"Warsaw Convention" or "Convention"]. The United States adhered to the Con-
vention in 1934.
1- 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,870 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
1' Id. Article 28 of the Convention provides that an action against an air car-
rier for personal injury or death of a passenger must be brought in one of the
following locations:
a. the carrier's domicile;
b. the carrier's principal place of business;
c. the carrier's place of business through which the contract has
been made; or,
d. the passenger's destination.
163 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,591 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
1" Id. at 17,592.
1,1 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that the "place of des-
tination" for jurisdictional purposes where a trip consists of several destinations is
the "ultimate destination" of the passenger. Gayda v. LOT Polish Airlines, 702
F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1983). Accord Butz v. British Airways, 421 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa.
1976), afd, 566 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1977); Vergara v. Aeroflot "Soviet Airlines",
390 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Neb. 1975).
1'- Air Crash Disaster at Malaga, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,593.
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tion outside the United States. 67 The court stated that
either a passenger or the carrier may present evidence
that certain terms in the contract of carriage arose by mu-
tual mistake. 68
In In re Air Crash Disaster at Covington, Kentucky ofJune 2,
1983,169 the United States District Court for the Central
District of California likewise dismissed on Article 28
grounds actions filed against a foreign carrier by passen-
gers who, at the time of the accident, were on the return
portion of a round-trip originating in Canada. 70
The United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California, in Hernandez v. Aeronaves de Mexico,' 7 '
held that when a single contract for travel has not been
issued by successive carriers, and one of the parties did
not regard the transportation as a single operation but as
two distinct domestic flights, the Convention did not ap-
ply. 72 The court stated that the "unilateral expectation"
of one of the parties does not determine the applicability
of the Convention. 73
B. Applicability of the Warsaw Convention
Two Courts of Appeal were presented during the sur-
vey period with the question of what constitutes an "acci-
dent" within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention, 74 with interesting results. The Ninth Cir-
167 Id.
1 " Id.
169 M.D.L. No. 569 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1984). This litigation arose out of the Air
Canada Flight 797 fire which occurred on June 2, 1983, while the aircraft was en
route from Dallas to Toronto.
170 Id.
171 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,227 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
172 Id. at 18,119.
17' Id. See also P. T. Airfast Serv., Indonesia v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d
162, 168, 188 Cal. Rptr. 628, 633 (1983).
174 Article 17 of the Convention provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered
by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the opera-
tions of embarking or disembarking.
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cuit, in the surprising decision of Saks v. Air France,'75
found an air carrier engaged in international transporta-
tion responsible under the Warsaw Convention for a pas-
senger's permanent hearing loss caused by normal cabin
pressurization changes during landing. The court held
that an injury caused by an air carrier's normal operation
is an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17 of the
Convention. In reversing the decision of the lower court,
which had dismissed the passenger's action on the basis
that she could not show that her injuries resulted from
some malfunction or abnormality in the aircraft's opera-
tion,176 the court stated:
[A] showing of a malfunction or abnormality in the air-
craft's operation is not a prerequisite for liability under
the Warsaw Convention. Imposition of such a require-
ment is not supported by either the language and history
of the Warsaw Convention, the contractual modification to
the Warsaw system known as the Montreal Agreement, or
the decision of many courts, including this one, which now
interpret the Convention as imposing absolute liability for
injuries proximately caused by the risks inherent in air
travel. ' 77
The effect of this holding, the dissent argued, is to im-
pose liability upon an air carrier for any occurrence that
results in injury to a passenger, making the carrier an ab-
solute insurer of a passenger's health. 78 The dissent also
noted that a conflict now exists between decisions of the
Ninth Circuit and the Third Circuit; 79 a conflict which
continues in light of the Third Circuit's post-Saks decision
of Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co. 180
In Abramson, the Third Circuit held that the alleged ag-
Id.
75 724 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 80 (1984).
,76 Id. at 1384.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 1389.
,79 Id. See DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir.
1978); Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
18o 739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S. Dec.
12, 1984)(No. 84-939).
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gravation of a passenger's pre-existing hiatal hernia dur-
ing the course of a routine and normal flight was not an
"accident" within the meaning of the Convention. 18' The
court rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the term's
meaning and reaffirmed its previous holding in DeMarines
v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 182 requiring proof of an "unu-
sual or unexpected happening" before it can be said that
an "accident" has occurred. 183 The court also distin-
guished its holding from the decision in Saks on the
grounds that Abramson's injury, unlike the pressurization
injury of Saks, was not "proximately caused by the risks
inherent in air travel."'' 84
Baker v. Lansdell Protective Agency,' 8 5 involved an action by
a passenger against a security agency for the loss of jew-
elry valued at approximately $200,000 which the passen-
ger claimed was removed from her hand luggage as she
passed through a security screening area at Kennedy Air-
port in New York. The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, applying the tripartite
test of Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,' 8 6 held that the pas-
senger was engaged in the operation of "embarking" at
the time her jewelry was allegedly stolen, bringing the
case within the terms of the Warsaw Convention.8 7 Fi-
nally, the court held that where the Warsaw Convention is
found to be applicable to the plaintiffs cause of action,
claims brought on other grounds are preempted. 88
1", Id. at 133.
'82 580 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1978).
Abramson, 739 F.2d at 132.
I, ld. at 133.
,85 590 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). For a further discussion of the Baker deci-
sion, see infra notes 213-215 and accompanying text.
,86 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976). The three fac-
tors considered by the Day court to determine when a passenger is embarking are:
(1) the nature of the activity the passenger was engaged in; (2) under whose con-
trol or at whose direction the passenger was acting; and (3) the location of the
activity. Id. at 33.
187 Baker, 590 F. Supp. at 170.
" Id. at 171. See also Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc., v. Pan Am.
World Airlines, Inc., 737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir.) appealfiled 53 U.S.L.W. 3510 (U.S.
Nov. 16, 1984 (No. 84-907)) (holding that the Convention is the exclusive liability
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1. Notice of Claims
In Denby v. Seaboard World Airlines,'89 the issue of
whether to characterize claims for shortages in the con-
tents of cargo containers as damage or loss for the pur-
pose of timely notice of claim under Article 26 of the
Convention 190 was presented to the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. The court reversed a lower court de-
cision which granted summary judgment in favor of the
carrier on the grounds that the shipper's claim for the loss
of thirty-six out of forty cartons of silver shipped by the
airline in a single container was barred because the ship-
per failed to give timely notice of the loss. After review-
ing the summary judgment evidence, the court
determined that unresolved factual questions remained
which bore on the question of whether the shipment was
damaged or lost and, consequently, whether timely notice
was required.' 91 Because of the increased use of the con-
tainerization technique in air transportation, characteriza-
tion of the shipment for purposes of applying the timely
notice requirement will likely be a significant issue in fu-
ture cases. 192
remedy for international air carriers, thereby preempting state law). For a further
discussion of Boehringer, see infra notes 234-237 and accompanying text.
189 737 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1984).
- Article 26 of the Convention provides that in case of damage to goods, the
carrier must be notified within seven days after discovery of the damage. In case
of loss, however, no notice is required. See Dalton v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 570 F.2d
1244, 1246 (5th Cir. 1978); Butler's Shoe Corp. v. Pan American World Airways,
514 F.2d 1283, 1285 (5th Cir. 1974).
"it The district court had analyzed the evidence in light of the House of Lords'
decision of Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines, Ltd., [1980] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 295
(H.L.)(Q.B.), which held that the loss of part of the contents of a passenger's suit-
case constituted damage to baggage rather than loss requiring notice under Arti-
cle 27(2) of the Convention. Denby v. Seaboard World Airlines, Inc., 575 F.
Supp. 1134, 1140-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The Second Circuit, however, considered
Fothergill as "simply the beginning of an inquiry" requiring additional facts con-
cerning what was actually to be delivered to the consignee the container including
the contents or merely the contents without the container. Denby, 737 F.2d at 179.
192 As stated by the court: "We prefer not to decide how far to extend Fothergill
to container shipments - an issue of importance not simply to these parties but to
many others, in the absence of a complete record with respect to the facts of this
case and the custom of the trade." Denby, 737 F.2d at 182.
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In Highlands Insurance v. Trinidad and Tobago Airways
Corp. 193 the Eleventh Circuit held that a shipper's failure
to give written notice of claim to the carrier for goods to-
tally destroyed barred its claim to recover damages for the
loss. The court refused to extend the holding of Dalton v.
Delta Airlines, Inc. 194 beyond situations where the destruc-
tion of the goods is both total and obvious to the car-
rier. 195 The court also held that the failure to give timely
written notice also barred the shipper's claim' for wilful
misconduct under Article 25 of the Convention.19 6
The Ninth Circuit was faced with a similar issue in Stud
v. Trans International Airlines. 197 The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed an order granting summary judgment in favor of
the airline on the ground that the shipper of a horse,
which became ill after delivery and subsequently died,
failed to give written notice of the loss within fourteen
days of the horse's arrival at its destination pursuant to
the Convention as modified by the Hague Protocol.'98
The court, following the reasoning of Dalton, noted that
the condition of the goods at the time they leave the car-
rier's hands should determine whether notice of claim is a
prerequisite to recovery. Since the horse was alive and in
apparent good health when it left the carrier's possession,
but subsequently became ill and died, timely notice of the
loss was required. 99
In an appeal from an order granting the carrier's mo-
tion for summary judgment based on the shipper's failure
to give written notice of its claim for delay, the Texas
,93 739 F.2d 536 (11th Cir. 1984).
194 570 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1978). Dalton, which involved a shipment of grey-
hounds that were discovered dead by the carrier at their destination, held that no
notice was required under Article 26 of the Convention for destroyed goods
where the carrier has actual notice of their destruction. Id.
195 Highlands Ins., 739 F.2d at 539.
1 Id. at 540.
197 727 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1984).
,98 Id. at 881, 882. Using the choice of law rules of California, the court deter-
mined that the contract of carriage was made in Canada, a Hague Protocol coun-
try, and therefore, applied the longer limitation period provided in the Protocol.
Id.
,: Id. at 883.
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Court of Appeals, in Hewlett Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Flying Ti-
ger Line, Inc. 20 0 held that Article 9 of the Convention did
not operate to defeat the carrier's notice of claim defense.
The court interpreted Article 9, which provides that a car-
rier cannot avail itself of Convention provisions that "ex-
clude or limit" its liability if the waybill does not contain
the specified information set forth in Article 8, to apply
exclusively to the Convention terms expressly limiting the
carrier's liability and the amount of damages a shipper
may recover and not to provisions pertaining to notice or
limitations. Additionally, the court rejected the shipper's
argument that Article 13(3) does not require notice to the
carrier if the goods fail to arrive after seven days from the
date they are scheduled to arrive and held that this provi-
sion only applies to goods lost or destroyed and not to
goods damaged or delayed.20 '
2. Limitation on Liability
In In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, on March 14,
1980,202 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York held that an airline, which could not
invoke the Convention's liability limitation because of a
defect in the type size requirement in its own ticket,203
also could not avail itself of the liability limitation provi-
sions contained in the domestic round-trip tickets issued
to members of a United States boxing team in their own
home cities for connection with their international flight.
The court determined, based on the separate handling of
the reservations, payment, issuance and delivery of the
tickets for the domestic and overseas flights, that neither
the carriers nor the passengers regarded the flights as a
"single operation" under Article 1(3) of the Conven-
tion.2 0 4 Since the carriers did not meet the terms of Arti-
2o 669 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
201 Id. at 415.
202 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,387 (2d Cir. 1984).
2- 535 F.Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), afd, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 147 (1983).
204 In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,389.
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cle 1(3), the court concluded that the overseas carrier
could not take advantage of the domestic carriers' Con-
vention notices.2 °5
In Marlen Stamps & Coins, Ltd. v. Rapp,20 6 an air carrier
successfully limited its liability under Article 22(2) of the
Convention 20 7 for the loss of a shipment of postage
stamps even though the air waybill erroneously listed the
stamps as "fabrics." The court stated that neither the
Convention nor the terms of the waybill imposed any
legal obligation upon the carrier to certify the contents or
value of specific parcels accepted for shipment. The fac-
tual questions surrounding the information on the waybill
were not material to a determination of the carrier's enti-
tlement to the Convention's liability limits. 20 8
In Exim Industries, v. Pan American World Airways Inc. ,209
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York held that a carrier need not include all of the
information contained in Article 8 of the Convention in its
waybill to take advantage of the Convention's liability lim-
itation, so long as the waybill contains sufficient informa-
tion to adequately identify the goods. Failure to state
whether the goods were "drums, bales or cartons" or to
note that the "cartons were marked 1-7" were insubstan-
tial and technical omissions, according to the court. Such
failure did not prejudice the shipper or extend the car-
rier's liability.210 Additionally, the court held that the
waybill need not list all of the particulars required by Arti-
cle 8(i), so long as one of the items is included on the
205 Id.
206 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,810 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
207 Article 22(2) of the Convention provides, in pertinent part:
In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the liability
of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram,
unless the consignor has made, at the time when the package was
handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of the value at deliv-
ery and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires .
Id.
Id.o0$Marlen, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,811.
200 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,803 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
210 Id. at 17,805.
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waybill.2 1'
In Baker v. Lansdell Protective Agency,21 2 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York
found that where a passenger only briefly relinquished
possession of her hand luggage for a required security
check, but retained responsibility for the transportation of
the property, Article 4 of the Convention requiring the
issuance of a baggage check did not apply, and the pas-
senger's recovery was limited to the Convention's liability
limitation pertaining to carry-on luggage.2 13 Additionally,
the court held that a security agency which had contracted
with the carrier to perform the required passenger secur-
ity screening was an agent of the carrier and was permit-
ted to take advantage of the Convention's liability
limits. 2 14
In Martin v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,2"5 the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia
determined, in an action to recover damages for the loss
of "checked baggage", that the liability limitations per-
taining to checked baggage applied even though the car-
rier failed to attach an issued baggage check to the piece
of baggage and also failed to record the weight of the bag-
gage on the claim check. Additionally, the court found
that the refusal of the baggage handler to check whether
the passenger's bag had been tied, despite the passenger's
request that he do so, did not constitute "willful
misconduct. '2 1 6
3. Damages Recoverable
In perhaps the most important judicial pronouncement
impacting the international aviation community since the
signing of the Convention, the United States Supreme
211 Id.
212 590 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
213 Id. at 170.
2 4 Id. at 170-71. For a further discussion of Baker, see supra notes 185-188 and
accompanying text.
2 563 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1983).
216 Id. at 141.
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Court, in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp. ,217
held that the Convention's cargo liability limit remains en-
forceable in the United States. Thus, the Court rejected
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' declaration that the
1978 repeal of the Par Value Modification Act, legislation
which had set an "official" price of gold in this country,
rendered unenforceable the liability limits of the
Convention. 1 8
The Court noted that a treaty cannot be abrogated or
modified by a later statute unless Congress' intent to do
so has been clearly expressed. Since there was no men-
tion of the Convention in any legislative material concern-
ing the Par Value Modification Act or its repeal, the Court
found no intent by Congress to abrogate or modify the
Convention's liability limits. 219 Additionally, the Court
observed that the Convention is self-executing, requiring
no domestic legislation to give it legal effect. Therefore,
if no domestic legislation is necessary to give the Conven-
tion the force of law, no such legislation, the Court rea-
soned, could implicitly abrogate it.22O In further support
of its rejection of the Second Circuit's holding, the Court
observed that no steps were taken by either Congress or,
the Executive Branch to notify other Convention signato-
ries of the United States' intent to withdraw from the
treaty. The Court, therefore, concluded that "the erosion
of the international gold standard and the 1978 repeal of
the Par Value Modification Act cannot be construed as
terminating or repudiating the United States' duty to
abide by the Convention's cargo liability limit." 221
The Court also approved the continued use of the
$9.07 per pound liability limit set by the Civil Aeronautics
217 104 S.Ct. 1776 (1984). The suit involved the loss of four packages of numis-
matic materials with a total weight of 714 pounds, which were accepted by TWA
from Franklin Mint for transportation from Philadelphia to London on March 23,
1979. Id.
218 Id. at 1783.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 1784.
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Board ("CAB"), which has the task of converting the Con-
vention's liability limit into United States currency. The
Court found that the CAB's choice of a liability limit does
not contravene any domestic legislation. Also, the $9.07
per pound liability limit represents a limit consistent with
the Convention's purposes of establishing a stable, pre-
dictable, and internationally uniform limit on an air car-
rier's liability and in establishing a link between the
Convention and a constant value which would remain eq-
uitable for both carriers and shippers.2 2 The Court rec-
ognized, however, that periodic adjustments by the CAB
of the liability limit, might be required to effectuate the
Convention's objectives. 2  Consequently, if the CAB
fails to make the necessary adjustments in light of the dol-
lar's changing value or for changes in other Convention
signatories' conversion rates, a court may find that the lia-
bility limit is no longer consistent with the Convention's
purposes and refuse to sanction its further use.
Two circuit courts of appeals, in cases arising out of the
same aircraft accident, 224 have reached opposite results
concerning the issue of whether prejudgment or
postjudgment interest may be recovered when the inter-
est award would exceed the liability limit established by
the Convention, as modified by the Montreal Agree-
ment. 25 In Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. ,226 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Convention and
Montreal Agreement objectives of maintaining a fixed and
definite level of liability while also encouraging speedy
compensation for damages and the maximum recovery
for injured parties or their survivors would be well served
222 Id. at 1785-86.
223 Id. at 1787.
224 The accident occurred on June 24, 1975, when Eastern Airlines Flight 66,
enroute from New Orleans to New York, crashed on its approach to John F. Ken-
nedy International Airport, Queens, New York.
25 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and
the Hague Protocol, Agreement CAB 18990, approved by order E-23680, May 13,
1966 (Docket 17325), 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) [hereinafter cited as "Montreal
Agreement"].
22,6 722 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1984).
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by allowing the recovery of both prejudgment and
postjudgment interest above and beyond the $75,000
limit established by the Montreal Agreement. 227 The
Fifth Circuit also affirmed the lower court decision of
Mahfoud v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. ,228 which held that the lia-
bility limit of the Montreal Agreement may be exceeded
by an award of prejudgment and postjudgment interest
because "it is unconscionable to let an airline delay litiga-
tion to an extent that a smaller amount of money may be
invested in order to pay a $75,000 claim. "229
However, in O'Rourke v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. ,230 the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals held that prejudgment in-
terest may not be awarded on a Convention/Montreal
Agreement judgment if the effect is to exceed the $75,000
liability limit. The court stated that "[a]lthough the
$75,000 limitation may be anachronistic, the awarding of
prejudgment interest in excess of this amount would be
contrary to the purposes of the two agreements.. .231 _
namely, to establish a uniform body of worldwide liability
rules to govern international aviation and to fix at a defi-
nite level the cost to airlines of damages sustained by their
passengers 232
Finally, in Boehringer-Mannhein Diagnostics, Inc., v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc.,233 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered whether attorneys' fees and prejudg-
ment interest may be awarded in a Convention case in-
volving the loss of cargo. Although the court disallowed
227 Id. at 264.
22 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,714 (W.D. La. 1982), affd 729 F.2d 777 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 78 (1984).
22.. Id. at 17,717.
2so 730 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1984).
23, Id. at 853.
232 Id. at 852. The court expressly disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning
for allowing an award of interest in excess of the liability limit. After reviewing
the developments leading up to the Montreal Agreement, the court determined
that the "speedy resolution of claims" objective relied upon by the Fifth Circuit in
reaching its decision was not a significant United States objective at the confer-
ence which led to the Montreal Agreement. Id. at 853, n. 20.
2 - 737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1984), appealfiled, 53 U.S.L.W. 3510 (U.S. Nov. 16,
1984)(No. 84-807).
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an award of attorneys' fees under Texas law, 34 it deter-
mined that attorneys' fees may be recoverable under fed-
eral law if it is shown that the "losing party has acted in
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive rea-
sons." 235 The court also upheld the lower court's award
of prejudgment interest based on its previous holding in
Domangue.236
C. Other Air Carrier Cases
In an action arising out of the Pan Am crash near New
Orleans, Louisiana, in 1982, the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in LeConte v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 237 up-
held the trial court's dismissal of an action brought by two
police officers against Pan Am for the mental anguish they
suffered as a result of their presence at the crash scene.
The court, applying Louisiana law, held that bystanders
may not recover for mental anguish suffered as a result of
another's injury or death.23 8
The Ninth Circuit, in Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Air-
lines, 239 ruled that there was no private cause of action
under section 404(a) of the Federal Aviation Act 240 for
discriminatory seating of handicapped individuals. How-
234 Boehringer-Mannheim, 737 F.2d at 459. Earlier in its opinion, the court had
held that the Convention is the exclusive liability remedy for international air car-
riers thereby preempting state law. Id. at 458. Accord, In re Mexico City Air Crash
of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983); Benjamin v. British European
Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978).
235 Boehringer-Mannheim, 737 F.2d at 459-60 (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.
v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975)).
236 Id. at 460.
237 736 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1984).
238 Id. at 1021.
2 39 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,263 (9th Cir. 1984).
24o 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a) (1982). At the time of suit this section provided:
It shall be the duty of every air carrier to provide and furnish inter-
state and overseas air transportation, as authorized by its certificate,
upon reasonable request therefor and . . . to provide safe and ade-
quate service, equipment, and facilities in connection with such
transportation ..
Id.
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 provided that § 404(a) ceased to be in
effect on January 1, 1983, except insofar as the section requires air carriers to
provide safe and adequate service. 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(2)(B) (1982).
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ever, 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act 241 does create a
private cause of action for passengers who suffer unjust
discrimination or unreasonable prejudice.2 42  Accord-
ingly, handicapped passengers who are injured by unrea-
sonable discrimination or prejudice on the part of air
carriers may recover compensatory damages under sec-
tion 404(b).
In O'Leary v. American Airlines,243 a New York appellate
court held that an alleged breach of a federal aviation reg-
ulation prohibiting an air carrier from allowing a passen-
ger to board an airplane if the passenger appears to be
intoxicated does not give rise to a private cause of action
because the passenger, who died from asphyxiation when
he choked on a piece of food while intoxicated, was not a
member of the class that the regulations were designed to
protect.244 The court, however, found that an action for
common-law negligence should not have been dismissed,
since a carrier who knows or in the exercise of reasonable
care should have known of a passenger's disability, such
as intoxication, is required to exercise the care reasonably
required by the passenger's disability and the existing cir-
cumstances. 245 Thus, a carrier may be held liable for per-
sonal injuries or death suffered by a passenger who
chokes to death as a result of his own intoxication.
The United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, in Monzo v. Amercian Airlines,24 6 dis-
missed an action for negligent and malicious
representation arising out of the arrest of a passenger for
illegally possessing a loaded weapon at an airport. The
court found that the passenger failed to show that the in-
formation given by the carrier's employees concerning
the carriage of a weapon onboard an airplane was incor-
rect, that the relationship between the passenger and the
24, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1976).
242 Hingson, 18 Av. Cas. at 18,264.
245 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,872 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
244 Id. at 17,874.
V45 Id.
246 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,742 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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carrier was such that the passenger had the right to rely
on the information and that the employee had a duty to
give the information with care.24 7 In addition, the court
dismissed the passenger's action for malicious prosecu-
tion and false arrest against the airport operator because
there was probable cause for the passenger's arrest.248
In Feuer v. Value Vacations, Inc. ,249 a New York court re-
fused to grant plaintiff's motion for class certification in
an action against a charter tour operator seeking damages
for breach of contract in failing to provide air transporta-
tion since there appeared to be no interested litigants,
other than the plaintiff, regarding the delayed flight.
In Cantor v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc. ,250 the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals held that a carrier's liability for
lost baggage was limited to the sum set forth in the car-
rier's tariff even though the passenger had exchanged her
ticket for that of another airline after her bags were air-
borne.2 5 1 The court held that the only contract between
the passenger and the airline was the passenger's first
ticket which necessarily incorporated the carrier's tariff.252
In Bella Boutique Corp. v. Venezolana Internaciaonal de Avia-
cion, S.A. (VIASA Airlines),253 a Florida court held that the
shipper failed to comply with the terms of the carrier's
tariff when it sent written notice of its claim to the carrier
seven months following the loss of the goods. 254 The
court interpreted the carrier's tariff to require written no-
tice of claim to be presented to the carrier within thirty
days following the issuance of the waybill.255 In addition,
the shipper's oral notice of non-delivery to the carrier
within three weeks after the issuance of the waybill was
247 Id. at 17,744.
248 Id. at 17,745.
249 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,045 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
2- 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,360 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
251 Id. at 18,361.
2.2 Id.
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
"4 Id. at 18,138.
25. Id.
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held to be ineffectual in the face of the controlling
tariff.256
The Third Circuit, in the case of First Pennsylvania Bank,
N.A. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 257 considered the post-dereg-
ulation viability of the "released value doctrine," under
which a carrier may limit its liability to the agreed value of
the goods so long as the shipper has the option of ob-
taining coverage for the full value of its goods, is advised
of the option, and chooses to pay a lower price for lesser
coverage. The suit involved the loss of a shipment of
bank checks totaling in excess of four million dollars. The
court, applying federal common law, held that the air car-
rier was allowed to limit its liability for the loss of the
goods in its care under the released value doctrine. The
court stated that the deregulation of air carriers has no
effect upon the applicability of the doctrine. In addition,
the court found that because the bank's first shipment of
checks was made before deregulation, the bank had con-
structive notice of the carrier's rate schedules referenced
in the contract of carriage even though the shipment was
lost almost one year after the bank's first shipment with
Eastern.258
Finally, in Arkwright-Boston Manufactureres Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Great Western Airlines, Inc.,259 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, applying
common law principles, upheld a contracting carrier's lia-
bility limitation contained in its air waybill because the
shipper had an opportunity to either declare a higher
value for the shipment or obtain insurance. Additionally,
the court determined that a connecting carrier, though
not named in the waybill, is entitled to benefit from the
contracting carrier's liability limitation since the waybill
governs the entire transportation of the shipment, and it
256 Id.
257 731 F.2d 1113 (3d Cir. 1984).
2. Id. at 1122.
25, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,668 (N.D. Iowa 1984).
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establishes the obligations of all participating carriers. 260
V. PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND NEGLIGENCE CASES
A. Strict Liability
McKay v. Rockwell International Corp. ,261 a case which ap-
peared prominently in last year's survey article, extended
the "government contractor defense" to insulate a manu-
facturer from being held strictly liable where the govern-
ment had approved the manufacturer's detailed design
specifications and the manufacturer had warned the gov-
ernment of known defects in the product. McKay has
spawned a number of cases during the current survey pe-
riod in which manufacturers of military aircraft have
urged the government contractor defense in product lia-
bility and negligence cases. A weakening of that defense
has recently been appearing, however.
Two courts have recently declined to follow McKay on
the issue of whether the government's approval of a con-
tractor's design specifications is sufficient to invoke the
government contractor defense. In Schoenborn v. Boeing,2 6 2
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, adopting the approach set out in the earlier
case of In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation,Z63 held
that the government contractor defense was not available
to Boeing because the United States Army merely pro-
vided Boeing with performance specifications and did not
"establish" the design specifications for Boeing's helicop-
ter.264 That multidistrict case arose from the crash of a
o Id. at 17,669.
26, 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 711 (1984). The McKay
court held that the manufacturer of a military aircraft ejector seat could not be
held liable under strict liability since the manufacturer had shown that the seats
were designed to government specifications, that the manufacturer had warned
the government about patent defects and that the government had reevaluated
the product after several accidents had occurred. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451.
262 586 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
263 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
2- Schoenborn, 586 F. Supp. at 716-17. The Agent Orange court set out three re-
quirements for a contractor to successfully invoke the government contractor de-
fense: (1) that the government established the specifications; (2) that the product
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United States Army "Chinook" helicopter that killed all
46 persons on board the helicopter. The accident was
caused by a failure of the helicopter's tandem rotor sys-
tem. Although the Army approved Boeing's design speci-
fications, the court expressly declined to follow the
extension of the government contractor defense articu-
lated in McKay. The court in Schoenborn held that the rea-
sons set forth in McKay for that court's approach to the
government contractor defense do not support applica-
tion of the defense in situations where the government
merely approves the design specifications. 265
Citing Schoenborn, a federal court in Florida refused, in
Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp. ,266 to apply the govern-
ment contractor defense to a defense contractor whose
design specifications had received government approval.
Grumman's efforts to apply the defense arose out of the
crash of a Navy aircraft which was catapault-launched
from the aircraft carrier Constellation and pitched into
the sea. The court found that Grumman failed to warn
the Navy about a defect in the aircraft flight control sys-
tem and that the Navy was unaware of the defect at the
time it approved Grumman's detailed design specifica-
tions.267 The court reasoned that "because the design de-
cisions material to the defect alleged required no military
expertise, there is no justification for insulating a contrac-
tor from liability where the government merely approves
the decision. 268
In Tozer v. LTV Corp. 269 a Maryland federal court refused
manufactured by the supplier met the governmental specifications in all material
respects; and (3) that the government knew as much as or more than the defend-
ant about the hazards to people that accompanied the use of the product. Agent
Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1055.
Because the trial court found that Boeing had established the specifications for
the CH-47 helicopter, the remaining two criteria of the Agent Orange test were not
addressed. Schoenborn,586 F. Supp. at 717.
265 Schoenborn, 586 F. Supp. at 717.
2- 593 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
267 Id. at 1072-73.
26 Id. at 1074.
2,19 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,212 (D. Md. 1984).
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to extend the government contractor defense to insulate a
government contractor that was found negligent in the
design of a military product, even though the design spec-
ifications for the product had been approved by the gov-
ernment. The court in Tozer distinguished McKay on the
basis that the court in the latter case applied the defense
in a strict liability context. The Tozer court noted that the
government contractor defense was intended to shield an
innocent contractor from the government's negligence or
protect the contractor that is simply complying with spe-
cific government specifications, but that no public policy
exists for protecting a government supplier from his own
negligent acts. 270
In McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft,271 a California court of
appeals reversed a jury verdict in favor of Sikorsky air-
craft, holding that the trial court erred in permitting the
introduction of evidence showing that Sikorsky had com-
plied with the Navy's specifications in manufacturing heli-
copters, and in refusing to instruct the jury that building a
product in accordance with government specifications was
not a defense to plaintiffs strict liability claim. The appel-
late court stated that evidence of Sikorsky's compliance
with Navy specifications constituted no evidence of
whether or not the helicopter was defective and the intro-
duction of such evidence improperly focused the jury's at-
tention on the manufacturer's conduct rather than on the
adequacy of the product itself. The court also rejected
the notion that compliance with Navy specifications was
relevant to the issue of "feasibility of alternative design."
Rather, the court explained, such compliance merely
showed "administrative or bureaucratic feasibility," as op-
posed to "physical or mechanical feasibility. 272
Because the trial court's error required a reversal of the
decision and remand for trial, the appeals court also ad-
dressed the question of whether Sikorsky could avail itself
270 Id. at 18,216.
271 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1983).
272 Id. at 209, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
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of the government contractor defense. The court ob-
served that California had not addressed the issue of the
circumstances under which a government contractor
could avail itself of the government contractor defense.
Therefore, the court of appeals instructed the trial court
to follow the Ninth Circuit's opinion in McKay, and held
that the defense would be available to Sikorsky if it could
demonstrate the following elements enunciated in McKay:
first, that the United States was immune from liability
under Feres v. United States273 and Stencel Aero Engineering
Corp. v. United States;274 second, that the United States es-
tablished or approved reasonably precise specifications
for the allegedly defective military equipment; third, that
the military equipment met the specifications; and fourth,
that the supplier warned the government of any defects or
dangers which it knew of but were unknown to the
government.2 75
In Kanaf Arkia Airlines v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp. ,276 the
plaintiff sought recovery for consequential damages aris-
ing out of the delivery of an allegedly defective aircraft.
Of the several theories advanced by plaintiff, the District
Court for the Southern District of New York granted de-
fendant's summary judgment on the plaintiff's strict liabil-
ity and negligence claims. The court distinguished
situations where an unduly dangerous product causes
damage to persons or property from situations where a
product simply does not function properly, as was the
case in Kanaf. Accordingly, the court held the case prop-
erly cognizable under commercial law not tort law. 77
The result would have been the same, according to the
court in Kanaf, under the law of Texas, where the aircraft
was delivered, and the law of Arizona, where the aircraft
27 340 U.S. 135 (1955).
274 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
27-5 McLaughlin, 148 Cal. App. 3d at 210-11, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 768 (citing McKay,
704 F.2d at 451).
270 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,661 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
277 Id. at 17,662.
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engines were made.2 78
In American Airlines, Inc. v. National Automatic Products
Co. ,279 the Connecticut Supreme Court construed a Con-
necticut statute to authorize the recovery of punitive dam-
ages in a products liability case based solely on property
damage to an aircraft.
B. Res Ipsa Loquitur
In Stubbs v. Hooks,280 an Indiana appellate court held
that the rental of tie-down space by a local aviation service
company did not create a bailment relationship requiring
the service to provide safe storage for the aircraft. Be-
cause the service company owed no duty to the aircraft
owner, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which provides a
mechanism for proving breach of duty, was not
applicable.2 8'
C. Persons Liable
In Torchia v. Fisher,282 an airplane owner was held liable
under a New Jersey statute for injuries and property dam-
age resulting from the crash of his stolen airplane. The
statute, which provided that aircraft owners are absolutely
liable for damages caused to persons or property on the
ground by their aircraft, was challenged by the aircraft
owner on grounds that it violated the due process clauses
of the New Jersey Constitution and the United States
Constitution. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the
statute's constitutionality, stating, that an aircraft owner,
as opposed to an innocent third-party, is "the better risk
bearer" and that the legislature could rationally decide to
place the loss on the owner who receives the benefits of
using the aircraft.283
278 Id.
27. 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,156 (Conn. 1984).
280 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). For a further discussion of
Stubbs, see infra notes 290-291 and accompanying text.
,2. Id. at 18,163-64.
2.2 95 N.J. 43, 468 A.2d 1061 (1983).
283 Torchie, 468 A.2d at 1063-64.
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In Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Kittitas County,28 4 the
Washington Supreme Court held that the owner and fixed
base operator of a county airport were not liable to the
insurer of an aircraft that landed on a closed runway and
was damaged when it hit snow berms on the edge of a
plowed taxi-way. The court found that the defendants
were not negligent for closing one of two runways since a
NOTAM 285 had been filed with the FAA warning pilots of
the runway closure, and no feasible means of marking the
snow-covered, closed runway existed.28 6 The fixed base
operator was not negligent in failing to inform the pilot by
means of the UNICOM 287 that.a runway was closed, the
court reasoned, because the UNICOM is an advisory ser-
vice which creates no duty to volunteer information that is
not requested and no responsibility to direct air traffic.288
In Stubbs v. Hooks,289 an Indiana appellate court ruled
that a bailment relationship was not created by a local avi-
ation service company's agreement to rent tie-down space
to an aircraft owner because the aviation service company
did not retain exclusive control of the aicraft. The left
wing of the aircraft was allegedly damaged by a ground
vehicle while the aircraft was secured in the tie-down
space. Absent a bailment relationship, the court opined
that the service company had no duty to provide safe stor-
age for the aircraft nor did it have a duty to control
ground traffic at the airport. Accordingly, the service
company was not liable for damages to the aircraft.2 90
In Weast v. Festus Flying Service Inc. ,291 a Missouri wrong-
i4 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,946 (D. Wash. 1984).
285 Literally, NOTAM means Notice to Airmen. The NOTAM system is oper-
ated by the FAA and provides pilots with information on airport conditions and
runway closures, among other things. Id. at 17,948.
286 Id. at 17,954-55.
287 "UNICOM is a non-government, air/ground radio communication facility
which may provide airport advisory service[s]," such as weather information and
information on runways in use, upon pilot request. Id. at 17,951.
.. Id. at 17,955.
219 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). For a further discussion of
Stubbs, see supra note 281-282 and accompanying text.
290 Id. at 18,163-64.
29 118 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,312 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
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ful death case that arose from an airplane crash during icy
conditions, the aircraft owner was found negligent for fail-
ing to warn the aircraft's pilot and passenger that the anti-
ice pump had been removed and for failing to note its re-
moval in the pilot's log.
292
D. Contribution and Indemnity
In Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. ,293 the Texas Supreme
Court adopted the system of comparative causation for all
products liability cases and cases combining products lia-
bility claims and negligence claims. Under the compara-
tive causation system, the jury compares the degree to
which the various parties contributed to the plaintiffs
damages. 294 The court in Duncan adopted a "pure" com-
parative system, allowing the claimant to recover the per-
centage of damages caused by each defendant, regardless
of the extent of the claimant's own percentage of
causation.29 5
The theory ofjoint and several liability for each defend-
ant found to have been a cause of plaintiffs injuries was
retained in Duncan, although the court modified the the-
ory in ruling that all defendants are to be held jointly and
severally liable regardless of whether the percentage of cau-
sation attributable to each of the defendants is greater or
lesser than that of the plaintiff.2 96 The court noted in this
regard that the share of an insolvent defendant should be
imposed upon the remaining defendants. Furthermore,
the court stated that the percentage of causation attributa-
ble to each settling tortfeasor shall be submitted to the
jury and shall reduce pro rata the liability of all the non-
I292 d. at 18,313.
293 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984). For a further discussion of Duncan, see supra
notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
2- Id. at 427-428.
I2 ld. at 428, 429. Texas negligence cases are governed by TEx REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1984), which provides that a plaintiff's action is
barred if the plaintiff is over fifty-one percent negligent in causing the occurrence.
Id.
I :d. at 429.
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settling defendants.2 97 Finally, the Texas Supreme Court
in Duncan abolished the common-law doctrine of indem-
nity between joint tortfeasors in a strict liability context
except for a product seller who is a mere conduit in the
marketing chain and who is not independently
culpable.298
E. Evidence
In United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp.299 the United States
Supreme Court ruled that confidential statements ob-
tained during an Air Force investigation of an air crash
and sought by plaintiffs pursuant to the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (the FOIA)30 0 were protected from pre-trial
discovery by exemption 5 of the FOIA. 30  The Court ob-
served that since the case of Machin v. Zuckert, °2 con-
fidendial statements taken by aircrash safety investigators
have been privileged and not subject to pre-trial discovery
in civil cases. Although the subsequent enactment of the
FOIA has made available to litigants numerous govern-
ment agency records and documents, the Court found
that Exemption 5 of the FOIA retains the Machin privilege
and other civil discovery privileges. 3
297 Id. at 429-32.
298 Id. at 432.
299 104 S. Ct. 1488 (1984).
s- 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
30, Section (5)(b) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1982), is one of nine exemptions to disclosure under this federal.statute requir-
ing government agencies to disclose records. Section (b)(5) provides that "inter-
agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by
law to a party other than an agency in litigation with an agency" are not required
to be disclosed. See Weber Aircraft, 104 S. Ct. at 1490.
302 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963). Machin held that
confidential statements taken by aircrash safety investigators were privileged and
therefore not subject to pretrial discovery. See Weber Aircraft, 104 S. Ct. at 1491.
3 Id. at 1492. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals construed the phrase
"would not be available by law" found in exemption 5 as being limited only to
those privileges explicitly recognized in the legislative history of the FOIA. "It
read [the] history as accepting an executive privilege for pre-decisional docu-
ments containing advice, opinions or recommendations of government agents,
but not extending to the Machin civil discovery privilege for official government
information." Id.
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In reversing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Court in Weber found that the confidential statements ob-
tained by the Air Force were "intra-agency memorandums
or letters" under the plain language of Exemption 5 and,
since the Machin privilege normally protects such state-
ments from discovery in civil litigation, the statements
could not be obtained by a private litigant through the
FOIA.3 4 The Court explained its holding by stating that
an anomaly would be created if private litigants could sup-
plement civil discovery and obtain normally privileged
material through the FOIA. The Court also based its de-
cision on government agencies' need for confidentiality to
"insure frank and open discussion. "305
A California appellate court held, in Loftleidir Icelandic
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. 306 that the opinion
testimony of a former National Transportation Safety
Board ("NTSB") employee concerning the cause of a
crash of a commercial flight should not have been ex-
cluded by the trial court since he did not actively partici-
pate in the NTSB's investigation of the accident while
employed by the NTSB, and since his opinions concern-
ing the cause of the crash were based on his independent
investigation after being retained by the airline., 7
In a personal injury action arising out of the forced off-
field landing of a Cessna 340, a pivotal issue arose as to
whether or not the impact of landing exceeded FAA re-
quired design strength for the Cessna aircraft. The Tenth
Circuit held that the plaintiff did not commit reversible
error in cross-examining the defendant's experts on that
issue with a diagram and deposition not admitted in
evidence. °8
Several cases during the survey period addressed the
admissibility of post-accident remedial measures. In Moe
-, Id. at 1492-93.
so5 Id. at 1494.
306 158 Cal. App. 3d 83, 204 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1984).
.o7 Id. at 91, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
o8 Blevins v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,656 (10th Cir. 1984).
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v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation,30 9 the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is
substantive as opposed to procedural in nature, thus re-
quiring a federal court in a diversity action to apply the
state rules pertaining to admissibility of post-accident re-
medial measures.3 1 0  The Moe case was a product liability
and negligence action arising out of an airplane crash al-
legedly caused by a defectively designed autopilot and
flight control system. Some time after the crash occurred,
the French manufacturer of the aircraft issued a
"newsflash" warning pilots of the possibility of the
autopilot's failure to disengage.
Although the Tenth Circuit in Moe found that Colorado
law at the time the case was tried allowed admission of
post-accident warnings in products liability actions, exclu-
sion of the "newsflash" was upheld because the trial court
also found the evidence to be inadmissible under Rule
403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence .3 1  The court ob-
served that subsequent .to the trial, the Colorado legisla-
ture had addressed the issue of admissibility of post-
accident remedial measures in product liability actions,
and such evidence is now to be excluded under Colorado
law except for the sole purpose of showing a duty to
warn.
3 12
In a non-aviation case, Schelbauer v. Butler Manufacturing
3- 727 F.2d 917 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 176 (1984).
310 Moe, 727 F.2d at 920.
"1' FED. R. EVID. 407 reads:
"When, after an event, measures are taken, which, if taken previ-
ously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of
the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or
culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not
require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when of-
fered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or
feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or
impeachment."
Id.
"" 727 F.2d at 934. The trial court expressly found that Rule 403 considera-
tions of prejudice and jury confusion outweighed the probative value of admitting
the "newsflash." Id.
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Co.,313 the California Supreme Court held that a post-acci-
dent warning about the danger of excess oil on roofing
panels was admissible in a products liability action. The
court reasoned that public policy reasons for excluding
evidence of post-accident remedial measures in negli-
gence cases are not applicable in a strict liability context
because it is unlikely that product manufacturers will
forego improvements of their products, and risk enumer-
able lawsuits, simply because evidence of such improve-
ments might be admitted against them. 4
VI. INSURANCE
A. General Exclusions
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Carib Aviation,
Inc., the issue presented to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida was whether the
loss of an aircraft at sea during a smuggling attempt was
excluded from coverage under the "conversion" exclu-
sion of the aircraft policy.3 1 6 The court held that the good
faith rental of an airplane to a pilot who lied about his
intended use to smuggle marijuana into the United States
was effective to avoid the "conversion" exclusion and af-
ford coverage to the insured for the loss of the aircraft. 7
The court observed that Florida law requires limiting the
effectiveness of exclusionary language in an insurance
policy to only those exclusions that are clearly delineated
by the express language of the policy.
In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Superior Court of California,
313 35 Cal. 3d 442, 198 Cal. Rptr. 155, 673 P.2d 743 (1984).
3.14 Id. at 452, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61, 673 P.2d at 747-48.
315 566 F. Supp. 1489 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
316 Id. at 1490. This conversion exclusion provided, in pertinent part:
This policy does not apply to: . . . loss or damage due to conver-
sion, . . . by any person in possession of the aircraft under a bail-
ment, lease, . . . or other encumbrance, nor for any loss or damage
during or resulting therefrom.
Id.
, Id. at 1492.
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County of Los Angeles,31 8 a California appellate court held
that neither a homeowner's policy nor an excess indem-
nity policy provided coverage for or a duty to defend the
pilot's estate in an action brought as a result of an air-
plane crash." 9 The insured contended that both policies
provided coverage because the pilot worked on his pre-
flight planning for the flight resulting in the accident at
home the night before flying, he was under the influence
of alcohol at the time of the accident, and he made repre-
sentations before the flight concerning his piloting expe-
rience.3 20 The court determined, however, that coverage
was excluded under both policies because no independ-
ent cause of the accident, unrelated to causes arising out
of the "use or operation" of the aircraft, existed. 2 '
The Nevada Supreme Court, in National Union Fire In-
surance Co. v. Reno's Executive Air, Inc. ,322 interpreted Exclu-
sion 5(e) of the Standard Air Taxi Endorsement
authorized by Part 298 of the Economic Regulations with
regard to damage to property carried on board a charter
flight by a passenger. 23 The court determined that the
clause was ambiguous because it did not specify in whose
possession the property being "carried in or on [the] air-
craft" had to be before the exclusion applied. 24
Although the court noted that the insurer did not draft
the statutorily mandated exclusion, the court determined
that the insurer could have put the insured on notice that
-8 142 Cal. App. 3d 406, 191 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1983).
3'9 Both policies excluded any liability arising out of the "ownership, mainte-
nance, operation, use, loading or unloading of . . . any aircraft. Id. at 410-
11, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 39-40.
-120 Id. at 415, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 42-43.
321 Id. at 417, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
3 682 P.2d 1380 (Nev. 1984).
.2 The endorsement provided: Unless otherwise provided in the policy of in-
surance, the liability insurance afforded under this policy shall not apply to:
Loss of or damage to property owned, rented, occupied or used by,
or in the care, custody or control of the Named Insured, or carried
in or on any aircraft with respect to which the insurance afforded by
this policy applies.
Id. at 1382.
.24 Id. at 1383.
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little or no coverage was provided for damage to a passen-
ger's property. 25
In Bellefonte Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Alpha Aviation,
Inc. ,326 a renter pilot sued by his passengers injured in an
airplane accident sought coverage under the rental com-
pany's airport liability policy and its aircraft liability pol-
icy. Finding that the hazard insured against in the airport
liability policy was the rental company's "ownership,
maintenance or use" of its premises at the airport, the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that there was no lia-
bility coverage to the renter pilot.3 27 Also, since the pilot
was operating the airplane under the terms of a rental
agreement for which he had paid a fee to the rental com-
pany, the court found that the pilot was not an "insured"
as defined by the aircraft liability policy.3 28
B. Compliance with Pilot Qualification and Airworthiness
Certificate Exclusions
In Potter v. Ranger Insurance Co. ,329 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered whether a policy provision
excluding coverage if the aircraft was operated in flight
with an ineffective airworthiness certificate was ambigu-
ous under Alaskan law. 33 0 The court determined that a
lay person after reading the exclusion would reasonably
conclude that he would be denied coverage if the airwor-
thiness certificate was not in effect, regardless of whether
or not he had actual knowledge of the certificate's
status.3 3
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in Security Mutual Cas-
325 Id.
32c, 310 N.C. 471, 312 S.E.2d 426 (1984).
327 Id.
328 Id.
.'32 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,871 (9th Cir. 1984).
3- The policy provided:
"This policy does not apply: ...
4. To any Insured:
• . . (b) who operates or permits the operation of the aircraft, while in flight un-
less its airworthiness certificate is in full force and effect .... Id.
33 Id. at 17,872.
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ualty Co. v. O'Brien, 2 also considered whether the policy
language concerning the need for an effective airworthi-
ness certificate was ambiguous. The court found the ex-
clusion unambiguous even though the policy failed to
define the terms "airworthiness certificate", "airworthi-
ness certification" and "full force and effect" 33 Constru-
ing the terms in light of the context in which they were
used, the court held that it was not necessary for the pol-
icy to either define the terms or refer to the FAA regula-
tions which define the terms. 4
In Threlkeld v. Ranger Insurance Co. ,335 the insured con-
tended that the language of the exclusion which required
the airworthiness certificate to be in "full force and effect"
while the aircraft was in flight was ambiguous because the
phrase might be construed to include all FAA regulations
relevant to aircraft operation. The court rejected this ar-
gument and held that the words, given their commonly
understood meaning, refer only to the effectiveness of the
airworthiness certificate and not to all potential FAA regu-
lation violations.3 36
In Stewart-Smith Haidinger, Inc. v. Avi-Truck, Inc., 7 the
Alaska Supreme Court held that the lack of an airworthi-
ness certificate for a surplus military aircraft destroyed in
a crash did not defeat coverage under the policy. The pol-
icy implied that the plane was insured when it carried
freight for hire in the only legal manner it could have
been expected to do so, as a public aircraft and without an
airworthiness certificate and therefore the insurance was
still in force. The court found that the insurer, by subse-
quently issuing a policy that denied liability when the air-
craft was flown under these conditions without an
effective airworthiness certificate, impermissibly altered
99 N.M. 638, 662 P.2d 639 (1983).
""Id.
'" Id. For a further discussion of the O'Brien decision, see infra notes 349-350
and accompanying text.
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 18,330.
'" 682 P.2d 1108 (Alaska 1984).
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the nature of the bargain . 3 8 The court also found that
the insurer could not defeat coverage on the grounds that
the pilots were not type-rated for the airplane since the
aircraft operator was led to believe by FAA employees
that no type-rating was necessary, that the insurance
binder made no mention of the requirement for a type-
rating and that the agent was aware of the pilots' qualifica-
tions.3 3 9 In Guyre v. United States Fire Insurance Co. ,340 a New
York appellate court held that an insurer was not entitled
to summary judgment based on the pilot clause of the pol-
icy which required that the aircraft only be operated by a
pilot holding a valid and effective medical certificate, even
though the insurer proved that the pilot of the aircraft at
the time of the crash had made several false statements on
his application for a FAA medical certificate. The court
determined that since the policy did not include specific
language that any misrepresentation made in the applica-
tion for a medical certificate would void the policy, the
policy remained effective. 4'
In Avemco Insurance Co. v. Clark,s42 the Tenth Circuit
considered whether coverage was afforded to a pilot not
specifically named in the pilot clause of the policy. The
pilot clause provided that the policy only applied when
the aircraft was in flight and was being operated by one of
two specifically named pilots. The printed portion of the
policy, however, defined "insured" to include any person
using the aircraft with permission of the named insured.
The court construed this provision to refer to a pilot of
the aircraft while in flight and to require reference to the
pilot clause to determine the pilots covered by the policy.
Since the pilots flying the aircraft at the time of the acci-
dent were not named in the pilot clause, coverage was not
afforded. 43
," Id. at 1117.
-9 Id. at 1118.
340 97 A.D.2d 964, 468 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1983).
34 97 A.D.2d 964, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
'42 1984 Fire & Casualty Cas. (CCH) 789 (10th Cir. 1983).
14- Id. at 790.
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Whether a VFR pilot is properly rated for a flight into
instrument meteorological conditions when the flight de-
parts in VFR conditions was the issue before the Texas
Supreme Court in United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Marr's
Short Stop of Texas, Inc. 344 The court held that a determina-
tion of whether a pilot is properly rated for the flight must
be made by examining the flight as a whole rather than in
segments. The characterization of a flight as either IFR or
VFR must be determined by examining the weather at the
commencement of the flight. Thus, where a VFR pilot
knew at the inception of the flight that he would encoun-
ter IFR conditions, he was not properly rated for the flight
under the terms of the policy. 345
The courts continue to disagree on the issue of whether
causation is required for an insurance company to avoid
liability on the basis of a breach of a condition in an avia-
tion policy. The Texas Supreme Court was faced with this
issue in Puckett v. United States Fire Insurance Co. ,346 which
involved the crash of an airplane that had not undergone
an annual inspection voiding its airworthiness certificate.
The insurer filed a declaratory judgment action relying on
a policy provision suspending coverage if the airworthi-
ness certificate was not in "full force and effect." The
court held that "an insurer cannot avoid liabilty under an
aviation liability policy unless the failure to inspect is
either the sole or one of several causes of the accident. '" 347
The court further held that a policy which does not re-
quire a causal connection between the breach of the pol-
icy and the accident violates public policy.3 48 Conversely,
the New Mexico Supreme Court, in Security Mutual Casualty
Co. 349 a suit involving similar facts and an identical policy
344 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 310 (Apr. 4, 1984).
4 Id. at 312.
- 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 55 (Oct. 24, 1984).
317 Id. at 56. The court specifically disapproved the holding to the contrary in
Schepps Grocer Supply, Inc. v..Ranger Ins. Co., 595 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. Civ. App. -
Dallas 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
31, Puckett, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 56.
34.. 99 N.M. 638, 662 P.2d 639 (1983). For a further discussion of the O'Brien
decision, see supra note 332-334 and accompanying text.
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exclusion, held that a causal connection between an exclu-
sion clause and the accident is not essential before cover-
age can be denied. 5 °
C. Lienholders
In American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Young,35 t the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that a breach of warranty
endorsement which contained the phrase that the insur-
ance "as to the .. .mortgagee ...shall not be invali-
dated by any act or neglect of the lessee, mortgagor or
owner . ."352 was, in effect, a separate contract between
the lienholder and the insurer, protecting the lienholder
against loss even though the terms of the policy were vio-
lated by the insured mortgagor. Thus, where the aircraft
was seized in Colombia by the Colombian government af-
ter the insured mortgagor became involved in drug traf-
ficking in violation of the policy terms, the lienholder was
not precluded from recovery under the breach of war-
ranty endorsement. 53
An Oregon appellate court, in The Bank of California,
350 Id. at 64 1. A majority of the courts which have discussed the issue do not
require a causal connection. See, e.g. Arnold v. Glove Indem. Co., 416 F.2d 119
(5th Cir. 1969); DiSanto v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 489 F. Supp. 1352 (E.D.
Pa. 1980); National Ins. Underwriters Inc. v. Bequeths, 280 F. Supp. 842 (D.
Alaska 1968), aftd, 429 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1970); Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Bright, 106 Cal. App. 3d 282, 165 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1980); O.Conner v. Proprietors
Ins. Co., 661 P.2d 1181 (Colo. App. 1982); Grigsby v. Houston Fire and Casualty
Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 572, 148 S.E.2d 925 (1966); Kilburn v. Union Marine &
General Ins. Co., 326 Mich. 225, 40 N.W.2d 90 (Mich. 1949); Macalco, Inc. v. Gulf
Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. App. 1977); Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club,
Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 189 Neb. 610, 204 N.W.2d 162 (1973); Security Mut.
Casualty Co. v. O'Brien, 99 N.M. 638, 662 P.2d 639 (1983); Baker v. Ins. Co. of
North America, 10 N.C. App. 605, 179 S.E.2d 892 (1971); Ochs v. Avemco Ins.
Co., 54 Or. App. 768, 636 P.2d 421 (1981); Contra Ranger Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 25
Ariz. App. 426, 544 P.2d 250 (1976); Avemco Ins. Co. v. Chung, 388 F. Supp. 142
(D. Hawaii 1975); American States Ins. Co. v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 456 F. Supp.
967 (S.D. II1. 1978); Migues v. Universal Airways, Inc., 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) at
17,250 (S.D. Miss. 1982); Bayers v. Omni Aviation Managers, 510 F. Supp. 1204
(D. Mont. 1981); South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Collins, 269 S.C. 282, 287 S.E.2d 358
(1977).
-1 329 N.W.2d 805 (Minn. 1983).
3 I5 d. at 808.
3 Id. at 811.
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N.A. v. Livingston,35 4 considered whether the language of a
breach of warranty endorsement required the lienholder
to "use all reasonable means to collect" the unpaid bal-
ance on the lien from the insured before proceeding
against the insurer or only "amounts more than ten days
overdue on the date of loss. ' 355 Finding the endorsement
unambiguous, the court required the lienholder to show
that it had used reasonable efforts to collect the balance of
its outstanding lien from the insured before proceeding
against the insurer.3 56
The United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, in General Electric Credit Corp. of Ten-
nessee v. Southeastern Aviation Underwriters Inc., had an
opportunity to interpret a breach of warranty endorse-
ment in light of the terms of the physical damage cover-
age provided in the aircraft policy. The suit arose after a
Cessna 404 aircraft owned by the insured disappeared
while it was leased to a third party. Although the insurer
agreed to pay for losses resulting from physical damage to
the aircraft, including its disappearance, under the terms
of the basic policy, the insurer refused to pay the
lienholder based on a policy provision excluding coverage
for "damage due to conversion, embezzlement or secre-
tion by any person in possession of the aircraft under a
lease .... ,,358 The lienholder, however, contended that
the endorsement excluded from coverage only those con-
versions, embezzlements or secretion which were "by or
at the direction of the Named Insured." Since the disap-
- 65 Or. App. 743, 672 P.2d 386 (1983).
355 The breach of warranty clause provided in part:
2. The liability of the Company to any Lienholder . . . shall not
exceed: (a) the unpaid balance due on liens pertaining to the aircraft
less unearned interest and unpaid installments more than 10 days
overdue on the date of loss or damage if any balance remains after
the Lienholder has used all reasonable means to collect amounts due
from the Named Insured; . .
65 Or. App. 743, 672 P.2d at 387.
556 Id.
357 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,827 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
, Id. at 17,828.
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pearance was not by or at the direction of the insured, the
lienholder sought payment under the policy.3 59 The court
disagreed and held that the endorsement did not extend
any coverage beyond that which was contained in the ba-
sic policy. Rather, the language in the endorsement was
inserted to make it clear that while the insurance company
was relieving the lienholder from the coverage invalidat-
ing consequences of certain acts and neglects of the in-
sured, conversion by or at the direction of the named
insured was not being excused. 60
Finally, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri held, in First Missouri Bank and Trust
Co. v. Bayly, Martin & Fay Aviation Insurance Services, Inc. ,361
that the effective date of cancellation of an insurance pol-
icy with respect to a lienholder as a result of the insured's
non-payment of premiums is measured from the date of
actual receipt of the cancellation notice by the lienholder




In Johnston v. Stoker, 63 the Utah Supreme Court held
that the Utah aircraft guest statute, just as its sister auto-
mobile guest statute, was unconstitutional under the Utah
constitution. The court reasoned that because the statute
failed to operate uniformly upon all persons, and because
it lacked a rational relationship to its intended objectives,
it could not pass constitutional muster. Consequently,
the court determined that no impediment existed to the
guest bringing a negligence cause of action against his
host.364
-59 Id.
3- Id. at 17,829.
- , 579 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
_1' Id. at 637.




In litigation arising out of the American Airlines DC- 10
tragedy in Chicago, the Second Circuit concluded, in Shu-
Tao Lin v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp.,65 that New York law
permits recovery for a decedent's pre-impact fear and ap-
prehension of impending death. The court held that suffi-
cient evidence was introduced to support a $10,000 award
for the decedent's pain and suffering before impact. The
evidence indicated that the decedent had been assigned a
seat over the left wing of the aircraft. The court con-
cluded that a jury might find that during the thirty
seconds between take-off and impact the decedent, by vir-
tue of his seat assignment saw the left engine and a por-
tion of the left wing break away. 66
In contrast with Lin, yet arising out of the same acci-
dent, the Second Circuit held, in Shatkin v. McDonnell-
Douglas Corp.,367 that there was insufficient evidence to
support a jury finding that a passenger seated on the right
side of the plane suffered any pre-impact pain and suffer-
ing. The distinction appears to be in the relative seat as-
signments of the victims. Since the passenger in Shatkin
was on the opposite side of the aircraft from where the
damage occurred there was no evidence that he was even
aware of the impending disaster until about three seconds
before the crash. 68
The Fifth Circuit held, in Haley v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc.369 that Louisiana law also permits recovery
for a decedent's pre-impact fear and apprehension of im-
pending death.370 Additionally, the court found that suffi-
cient evidence was presented to support an award of
$15,000 for the decedent's mental anguish prior to im-
s65 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984). For a further discussion of the Lin decision, see
infra notes 384-388 and accompanying text.
31W Id. at 53.
,17 727 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1984).
- Id. at 206-07.
-' 746 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1984). This suit arose from the crash of Pan Am
Flight 759 near New Orleans, Louisiana, on July 9, 1982. Id.
370 Id. at 315.
19851
116 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [51
pact. The court concluded that, based on expert testi-
mony describing the aircraft's flight, a jury could
reasonably infer that the decedent was aware, for at least
four to six seconds prior to impact, of the impending dis-
aster.3 7 ' The court, also reduced the jury's award of
$350,000 to each parent for the loss of love and compan-
ionship of the twenty-five year old decedent, noting that
the largest judgment in Louisiana for the loss of an adult
child was $150,000.372
In Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Yowell, 373 a Texas appellate court
held that damages for loss of society, companionship and
affection suffered by the surviving parents, spouses, and
children of adult passengers killed in the mid-air disinte-
gration of an airplane are not recoverable under the
Texas Wrongful Death Statute. 4 The court concluded
that the Texas statute allows recovery by a parent for only
the intangible emotional losses associated with the death
of a minor child. 75 The court also held that prejudgment
interest may not be awarded in wrongful death cases.376
In Bullard v. Barnes,377 the Illinois Supreme Court de-
fined the pecuniary injuries suffered as a result of the death
of a minor child under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act 378
to include the loss of the child's society. However, the
child rearing expenses which the parents would have in-
371 Id. at 317.
372 Id. at 318-319. The court reduced the award to $200,000 to each parent. Id.
373 674 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. App. - Ft. Worth 1984, writ requested).
374 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4671-4678 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
37 Yowell, 674 S.W.2d at 461-62. Currently, Texas law only allows the recovery
of non-pecuniary damages in a suit by a parent for the death of a minor child.
Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983). The Texas Supreme Court,
however, when faced with the issue raised in Yowell, will likely expand the Act to
allow recovery of non-pecuniary damages in all death cases brought under the
Texas Act. In fact, one Texas court has already interpreted Sanchez to allow the
recovery of non-pecuniary losses in all death cases. See Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Daw-
son, 662 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ requested).
376 Yowell, 674 S.W. 2d at 462-63.
377 102 Ill. 2d 505, 468 N.E.2d 1228 (1984).
7" ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70 §§ 1-2.2 (1979). The Act provides, in part: "[I]n every
such action the jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and just
compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death,
to the surviving spouse and next of kin of such deceased person." Id. § 2.
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curred had the child lived, are to be deducted by the jury
from any amount awarded for the loss of society.3 79
C. Calculation of Damages
In Sosa v. M/V Lago Izabal,380 the Fifth Circuit held that
the district court was correct in increasing a claimant's
award for lost future wages by the amount of tax the
claimant would pay on the interest accrued by the lump
sum awarded. The court ruled that this adjustment was
appropriate under the rule enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v.
Liepelt.38 Under that rule, a wage earner.s income tax is a
relevant factor to be considered in calculating an award
for estimated future earnings. 82 The Fifth Circuit added
that it "will approve any reasonably safe arrangement that
will produce an after-tax income equivalent to that lost by
the plaintiff. 3 8 3
In Lin v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. ,384 the Second Circuit
also addressed the effect of income taxes on determining
an award for lost future earnings. The court ruled that a
defendant had been denied the practical effect of the
Liepelt ruling385 when the trial court allowed the jury to
consider that a decedent's future income stream would
have been subject to income tax in conjunction with evi-
dence that the income stream produced by the damage
award would also be subject to that tax. In assuming that
the taxes on decedent's future income stream and the
taxes paid on the income stream produced by the damage
379 Bullard, 468 N.E.2d at 1234-35 (1984).
38 736 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1984). Although Sosa is not an aviation case, its
holding will probably affect the calculation of lost future earnings in aviation
cases.
3, 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
382 736 F.2d at 1033-34.
3- Id. at 1034 n. 5.
384 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984). For a further discussion of the Lin decision, see
supra notes 365-366 and accompanying text.
.- The court chose not to address the issue of whether the district court was
correct in holding that New York would apply the Liepelt ruling in wrongful death
cases. Id. at 50-51.
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award would equal one another, the district court had
erred in not allowing for the decedent's potential income
tax liability in computing damages.386 The court further
found that the trial court had improperly concluded that
taxes would likely be paid on the income produced by the
award when no evidence of the future tax was intro-
duced. 87 The Second Circuit also established that pre-
judgment interest, under New York law, is limited to
losses suffered between the date of death and entry of
judgment. Thus, prejudgment interest is not to be applied
to postjudgment losses which are discounted to their
present value. 88
Finally, the courts have considered the impact of in-
come taxes on damage awards. The United States District
Court for the Western District of Kentucky, in Calarie v.
United States,389 concluded, based on Liepelt, that income
taxes should be considered in awarding damages under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.390
34 Id.
387 Id. at 51.
s8" Id. at 52.
-9 No. C 79-0357-L(B) (W.D. Ky. July 25, 1984).
s"n Id.
